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Establishing an Island of Patent
Sanity
Oskar Liivak†
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing, inescapable sense that something
has gone terribly wrong with the patent system. Though it was
founded
with
the
laudable
constitutional
goal
of
“promot[ing] . . . [p]rogress” in the “useful [a]rts . . . ,” today, it
is hard to find any positive news suggesting progress.1 Current
patent lawsuits are widely described as a “battle”2 or a “war.”3
And though litigators often use such allusions,4 this time the
scale and the feel is different. During the past decade we
witnessed an escalating intellectual property cold war where
huge sums spiraled into a rapidly growing patent-industrial
complex. Companies “stockpil[ed]”5 patents in huge numbers,
†

Associate Professor, Cornell Law School. I would like to thank T.J. Chiang,
Kevin Collins, John Duffy, Michael Frakes, Glynn Lunney Jr., Robert Merges, Michael
Meurer, Bhaven Sampat, Josh Sarnoff, Henry Smith, and Geertrui Van Overwalle for
helpful discussions and encouragement. This article has benefited from presentation at
the 2012 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference held at Stanford Law School.
1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2
Steve Lohr, Apple-Samsung Battle Shifts to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
2012, at B1 (describing how Apple “assembled an ‘Android war room,’ where its
employees can study Android products”).
3
Laura Sydell, Samsung Fight Among Many in Apple’s Patent War, NPR
(July 30, 2012, 5:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/30/157571532/samsung-fightamong-many-in-apples-patent-war.
4
See Matthew D. Powers et al., The Successful Patent Litigator Must Learn
the Way of Strategy: The Opportunities and Risks of Claim Construction, in F. SCOTT
KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 874-76 (4th ed. 2008)
(citing both a samurai strategy book as well as Sun Tzu’s THE ART OF WAR, and stating
“litigation is a form of warfare”). Note that one of the authors, Matthew D. Powers, is
one of the most respected patent litigators, who left his position at Weil, Gotschall, &
Manges and is now representing nonpracticing entities. See Ashby Jones, When
Lawyers Become “Trolls,” WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2012, at B1.
5
Andy Baio, A Patent Lie: How Yahoo Weaponized My Work, WIRED (Mar.
13, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2012/03/opinion-baio-yahoo-patentlie/ (“Yahoo assured [its programmers] that their patent portfolio was a precautionary
measure, to defend against patent trolls and others who might try to attack Yahoo with
their own holdings. It was a cold war, stockpiling patents instead of nuclear arms, and
every company in the valley had a bunker full of them.”).
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not because those patents brought with them useful
technology, but rather because they granted the patent holders
devastating rights of exclusion.6 Patents, like some legal strain
of anthrax, have been “weaponized.”7 With those stockpiles,
patent holders have gone “thermonuclear”8 on their rivals.9 In
the tech world, we are witnessing “World War III.”10 The patent
threat even extends beyond the industrial superpowers, as
patents from failed start-ups are compared to “loose nukes”
that are finding their way into the hands of patent trolls intent
on patent “terrorism.”11 Though someone might be left standing
at the end, the rest of us cannot imagine how the resulting
economic fallout counts as the “progress” promised and
demanded by the Constitution. From Silicon Valley engineers,
to economists, to legal scholars, and now to judges, the patent
system is thought to be “in crisis,”12 “broken,”13 a “failure,”14 “an
unnecessary evil,”15 and “dysfunctional.”16 So what has
happened? Who is to blame?
6

Susan Decker & Brian Womack, Google Buys 1,023 IBM Patents to Bolster
Defense of Android, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-09-14/google-purchases-1-023-patents-from-ibm-to-bolster-portfolio.html
(describing how Google acquired “17,000 [patents] with its $12.5 billion acquisition of
Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc.”).
7
Baio, supra note 5.
8
Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Could Steve Jobs Actually Win His Thermonuclear
War?, CNN (June 30, 2012, 6:53 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/06/30/couldsteve-jobs-actually-win-his-thermonuclear-war/ (describing how Steve Jobs told his
biographer that “‘Google has ‘f***ing ripped off the iPhone’ . . . , promising to go
‘thermonuclear’ to destroy Android”).
9
See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Apple v. Samsung: The Patent Trial of the
Century Starts Today, CNN (July 30, 2012, 8:02 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/
2012/07/30/apple-v-samsung-the-patent-trial-of-the-century-starts-today/.
10
Sydell, supra note 3. As Albert Einstein famously stated, “I do not know
how the Third World War will be fought, but I can tell you what they will use in the
Fourth—rocks!” See THE NEW QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 173 (Alice Calaprice ed., 2005).
11
John Brandon, Fark.com Founder Links Patent Trolls with “Terrorists,”
FOX NEWS (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/04/18/farkcom-winspatent-dispute-by-not-negotiating-with-terrorists/ (“[P]atent troll [was described as] a
company established . . . solely to make cash through patent lawsuits . . . . Drew Curtis, the
founder of Fark.com, calls them terrorists to be avoided at all costs. ‘It boils down to one thing:
don’t negotiate with terrorists,’ Curtis said during a talk at the TED 2012 conference.”).
12
DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 3 (2009).
13
See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1-24 (2004).
14
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 45 (2008).
15
MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 7 (2008).
16
Richard A. Posner, Capitalism, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (June 3, 2012),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/06/capitalismposner.html (“The institutional
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Some blame the patent system, calling for it to be
dismantled.17 Some blame patent trolls for their overly
aggressive patent assertion practices. Some blame the Patent
and Trademark Office for its shoddy quality control. Some
blame the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for its
overzealous support of patent holders. Yet I am not sure we can
so easily place blame on any one group. Despite the widespread
discontent, we cannot prove that something is actually amiss.
As far as current patent theory goes, we aren’t sure anything
has gone wrong, but the theory is so indeterminate that we also
aren’t sure anything has gone right either.
The embarrassing fact of the matter is that although
the current theory of patents has been around for roughly the
past two hundred years, it has never been able to justify the
patent system as it exists. The patent system is explained as a
general program for encouraging technological progress. By
granting valuable rights of exclusion to patent holders, the
system aims to divert rents to patent holders so as to induce
the socially optimum level of technological advances. Though
this underlying purpose is simple to state, it has created an
intractable cost–benefit analysis that resists either justification
or, alternatively, falsification.
Once framed as inducing behavior through artificial
incentives, we know there are benefits, and we know there are
costs—but we don’t have reliable tools to quantify them. As a
result, we cannot prove that the patent system is or is not
socially beneficial. The result is patent policy that is based on
“guesswork”18 as patent proponents and critics are buoyed by
“faith” alone.19 The indeterminacy has produced two hundred
years of “patent controversy.”20 Sixty years ago, Learned Hand
lamented that the patent debate is “approach[ed] . . . with

structure of the United States is under stress . . . . We have a . . . dysfunctional patent
system . . . . Our capitalist system needs a lot of work to achieve proper capitalist goals.”).
17
See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 15, at 12.
18
American Patent System: Hearing on S. Res. 92 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 116,
120 (1959) (statement of Judge Learned Hand) [hereinafter Hand on Patent Reform].
19
See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 253 (1996) (describing support for the
“current system” as “an article of religious faith”); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra
note 14, at 74 (quoting James Boyle as grounding IP policy not on empirical evidence
but instead on “‘faith-based’ reasoning”).
20
Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth
Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1-2 (1950) (“[T]he controversy about the patent of invention
is very old . . . .”).
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enormous passion but without enlightenment.”21 One side
argues that the system is essential for “American industry,”
while the other side calls the system “a beastly method.”22 “No
one really knows. Each side is beating the air.”23 A great deal of
research has been directed at the patent system,24 yet the
underlying intractability remains.
Is there really no terra firma within this “slough of
despond”?25 Is there no core, no matter how small, around
which consensus could begin to build? This article argues that
the current patent dysfunction is not the fault of any one group,
but rather that the fault lies with patent theory and the way it
has framed the patent debate. Not only does patent theory’s
intractable analysis preclude acceptance (or falsification), but it
also provides no direction for patent reform. As will be argued
below, the problem is that the theory has asked too much from
the system. A more narrowly focused theory can provide needed
solid ground on which to build a patent system.
In particular, current patent theory assumes that
patents are designed to directly create incentives that will
induce the optimum amount of inventive activity. In other
words, the system grants, to inventors, fairly absolute rights of
exclusion of some predesigned breadth and length. To justify
and evaluate that system, patent theorists then enumerate all
the behaviors that these rights induce. In essence they are
identifying all the ways in which patent holders can monetize
these exclusive rights. The empirical case for that incentivebased system then amounts to accounting for the costs and
benefits of all these enumerated behaviors. Not only do we
hope that the benefits outweigh the costs but we also hope that
we can maximize the benefits minus the costs. This grand
accounting has proven to be intractable and its optimization is
even more so.
To establish patent theory’s more solid grounding, this
article departs from the standard incentive-creating narrative
where patents are seen as directly creating incentives. Rather
than starting with absolute rights and then listing induced
behaviors, this article begins by identifying specific socially
beneficial behavior and then determining the exclusive rights
21

Hand on Patent Reform, supra note 18, at 116.
Id.
23
Id.
24
See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1035 & n.8 (2005).
25
John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 525 (2010).
22
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(no longer necessarily absolute) needed as instrumental support
for that beneficial behavior. In particular, this article identifies
private decision-making in the creation and market distribution
of inventions (rather than information or technology) as socially
beneficial behavior. It then identifies the minimal patent system
necessary to support, but not directly incentivize, those
particular activities. That exclusion provided by the patent
system is the instrumental means to serve the higher purpose of
getting inventions from their creators to potential users.
Exclusion, then, is not aimed at creating incentives per se, but
rather at preventing particular third-party acts that would
disrupt (that is, harm) the social benefits of creating and
distributing inventions. The result is an island, certainly a small
one, of justifiable activity and patent exclusion. In other words,
patent holders who undertake the hard, but socially beneficial,
tasks of creating and disseminating inventions deserve the
protection of the patent system and, in particular, deserve
protection from third party acts that harm that socially
beneficial activity. And though controversy may well continue
to hound the patent system, this article argues that, no matter
what reforms are proposed, those that are diligently marketing
and disseminating their patented inventions should receive
robust protection from the patent system.
Though real progress establishing even such a limited
island of justified patent activity is welcome, the specifics of
this proposal may be greeted with suspicion, as it surely raises
an important and obvious challenge. Even if agreeing with the
need for a new patent theory, many will doubt that a
straightforward voluntary market exchange of inventions could
provide a workable patent narrative. After all, such a market is
quite familiar from the tangible free market: if it could be done,
why hasn’t it been done before? Indeed, the conventional view
is that such a market narrative is doomed to fail when applied
to public goods, such as technology. Technological information
is thought to be too different from the well-understood world of
tangible goods and, as a result, it is generally thought that a
market model is not suitable for the patent system.
In fact, highly influential economic thinking has
regarded such a market for technology to be ill-advised. The
work of two of the twentieth century’s greatest economists
appears to argue against such a market. In economist Kenneth
Arrow’s influential paper, he argued that a market would be
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unable to achieve an optimal allocation of resources for
inventions.26 Since its publication in 1962, that paper has
formed one of the core objections to a strictly market-based
solution for innovation.27
In addition, Paul Samuelson’s work on public goods, in
which he describes what has become known as the “Samuelson
condition,” also stands as an obstacle.28 After deriving a toplevel condition for the optimal allocation of resources toward
creating public goods like technology,29 Samuelson addressed
whether private decision-making could ever lead to that optimal
allocation of resources. He concluded that it could not30:
consumers for the public good would systematically
underrepresent their valuation of the public good and this would
then prevent the optimal allocation of resources toward creating
public goods.31 Arrow and Samuelson’s arguments are largely
accepted as correct, standing as truly formidable obstacles to a
market-based theory of patents.
This article argues that Arrow and Samuelson were
generally correct, but that they did not consider certain
specific, exceptional cases that could provide a stable core for
the current patent system. Those exceptional cases have
remained unexplored because we have generally thought their
scope too narrow. In a sense we have been asking the patent
system to do too much. We have assumed that the patent
system must be some universal technological information
generation machine. With that broad purpose then, the abovementioned economic worries do indeed rightfully block a
market-driven narrative for the patent system and we are
likely stuck with our current indeterminate narrative. Yet
what if we asked for less? What if we aimed for a more
manageable objective? This article argues that the patent
system should not focus on technological information
generation generally; instead, it should focus on something

26

See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 619 (1962), available at http://www.nber.org/books/univ62-1.
27
Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual
Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 228-29 (2012).
28
RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES,
PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 23 (2d ed. 1996).
29
See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 387, 387-88 (1954).
30
Id. at 388.
31
Id. at 388-89.
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narrower and more concrete: the creation and dissemination of
inventions.
In earlier research, I have focused on the invention in
patent law as a doctrinal and conceptual matter.32 I have
argued that the invention is an important substantive concept
that is currently under-utilized and under-theorized.33 My
work, along with others, has shown that we can solve a number
of pressing doctrinal problems by using a substantive vision of
the invention in patent law.34 This article adds to that work by
emphasizing the invention’s fundamental role in directing the
patent system to focus only on those technological artifacts that
can be exchanged in an open market. It will show that
inventions are in fact exceptions to the more general arguments
of Arrow and Samuelson.
Though general technological information may be illsuited for market commodification, this article will show that
inventions are exceptional—they can be commodified.
Inventions are completed solutions to relevant technological
problems wherein that solution is refined enough that it is
ready to be practiced by “any” person of skill in the art.35 In
economic terms, an invention can be thought of as a production
plan,36 a package of technological information that can
effectively interface with neoclassical firms via the existing
price system. By solving a relevant technological problem and
by expanding a firm’s production possibilities, an invention (as
opposed to technological information generally) is a “thing”
that can be valued by the neoclassical firm. This article will
32

See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2012) [hereinafter Liivak, Rescuing the Invention]; Oskar
Liivak, Finding Invention, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 57, 63-68 (2012) [hereinafter Liivak,
Finding Invention] (uncovering the historic understanding of the invention as the set of
embodiments disclosed in the patent and applying that understanding to explain a
variety of claim scope decisions).
33
See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 32, at 4-6; Liivak, Finding
Invention, supra note 32, at 63-68.
34
See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 32, at 4-6; Liivak, Finding
Invention, supra note 32, at 59-60; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the
“Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1862-63 (2012) (developing an “external”
definition of the invention and contrasting that against a “claim-centered” definition of
the invention and ultimately arguing for the “external” definition as better fitting
patent law and policy).
35
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring that a patent “specification”
contain sufficient detail “to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . .”).
36
Cf. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 371-72 (7th ed. 1998); see also infra note 166 and accompanying text (further
discussing production plans).
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show that a critical aspect of the patent system’s modular
design architecture is achieved by limiting patent protection to
inventions, and that such a system can support an
economically justified market in those inventions even though
a more general market for information may well prove
problematic. In other words, we can justify the patent system
when we view it as providing the legal support for a socially
beneficial market for the voluntary exchange of inventions.
There are three relatively high-level ways to theoretically
view the intervention suggested here: a property-based
intervention, an economic intervention, and an adjudicatory
intervention. As to property, in previous work, I highlighted how
traditional property evolved during the 1800s—from an
institution that aimed to prevent competition to an institution
that now sits at the core of fostering competition.37 The theory
emphasized here similarly shifts our notion of patents from a
type of industrial policy toward a species of property for
undergirding a market for inventions.38
As an economic matter, this reorientation of patent
theory also bears some structural resemblance to Robert
Lucas’s criticism of macroeconomics.39 The so-called Lucas
critique called into question macroeconomic models and their
policy prescriptions because they were not built on policy
invariant microeconomic foundations.40 Patent law’s current
narrative focuses on macroeconomic parameters such as the
optimal amounts of innovation and other such aggregate
quantities. Many of its current policy prescriptions for specific
issues—e.g., remedies—are recognized as having elements of
circular reasoning.41 In contrast, the market narrative
developed here aims to build the patent system up from
individual transactions between inventors and those that can use
those inventions. In line with Lucas’s broader critique, this new
market narrative focuses the patent system on more concrete

37

See Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy to
Intellectual Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1180-81 (2012).
38
See id.
39
See generally Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Econometric Policy Evaluation: A
Critique, 1 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY 19-46 (1976),
reprinted in THEORY, POLICY, INSTITUTIONS: PAPERS FROM THE CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER
SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY 257-84 (Karl Brunner & Alan Meltzer eds., 1983).
40
Id. at 258, 261-62, 267, 273, 277.
41
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2044 (2007); John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and
Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2115 (2007).
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microeconomic behavior, which opens the door to a more thorough
microeconomic analysis and hopefully, to consensus.
Lastly, the shift also aids the adjudication of patent law.
In the current theory, judges are forced to decide cases, yet
they rarely see whether those decisions in fact lead to aggregate
benefits for innovation. With our current incentive narrative,
that causal connection is fraught with confounding factors and
judges may feel at sea in these cases. Although the technological
component of patent cases is blamed for the judicial dislike of
patent cases at times, I suspect that this decoupling of judicial
decision-making from clear societal benefit and justice may
actually be the more disagreeable aspect of patent cases.
Learned Hand noted this disconnect in his testimony before the
Senate. Based on his extensive “experience . . . from the many
cases that came to [his] attention,”42 he was asked, “Did [patents]
on the whole promote the arts and sciences?” Learned Hand
lamented, “That is just what a judge never gets . . . , how
essential [the patent] was for the progress of the
arts . . . . [Judges] have no idea . . . whatever . . . as to how the
system itself is in fact influencing the production of
inventions.”43 In the current narrative, judges are forced to
decide without any real ability to see the decision’s impact on the
overall purpose of the system. In contrast, the system’s purpose
with the market narrative is narrower—to enable specific socially
beneficial transactions between patent holders and users of those
inventions.44 For that system, a judge makes a quite different type
of decision, which takes place in far more familiar territory. It
allows the judge to use institutional competence and experience
from other areas of commercial and private law in regulating and
channeling behavior in this market as well. All three of these
conceptual views of the market narrative show how its adoption
would benefit the patent system.
Part I of this article describes current patent theory and
its emphasis on balancing access against exclusion. It then
details patent theory’s unresolved indeterminacy and other
problematic features. Part II explores an enticing alternative
where private decision-making alone, without government
inducement, guides the allocation of resources in the
42

Hand on Patent Reform, supra note 18, at 116.
Id.
44
In this sense, this market narrative focuses much closer on actual
innovation rather than just the act of invention. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE
THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 88-89 (4th prtg. 1951) (discussing the distinction
between invention and innovation).
43
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production and dissemination of technology. That section
describes the conventional view that such a straightforward
market for technology would be fatally flawed. It details work by
both Kenneth Arrow and Paul Samuelson, which cautions
against relying on such a simple market for technology. Despite
those widely held reservations, the section ends by providing an
intriguing counter example—a specific package of technology, a
cost-saving process—that can overcome both Samuelson and
Arrow’s objections. Part III takes that example and generalizes
its exceptional properties in order to build a patent system that
supports the voluntary exchange of inventions. Surprisingly,
though this new normative theory is different in kind from
existing theories, the patent system that is needed to back such
a theory is not very different at all from our existing patent
statute. Though our existing patent statute can serve this new
normative goal, the section will highlight how our
interpretation and emphasis of those statutory features will
have to change. Section V describes some implications of this
new normative view and describes future research questions.
I.

PATENT INCENTIVE THEORY AND ITS FAILURE

This section describes the current normative framework
for patent law. Right now, patent law is seen as a necessary
intervention in the existing free-market economy where patents
aim to grant “above-market” rewards to inventors such that
society as a whole undertakes the optimal amount of inventive
activity. This section then describes how that normative
framework has failed to provide a tractable, determinate
narrative. The section further lists a number of related
deficiencies in addition to that primary failure.
A.

Patent Incentive Theory

As to intellectual property and innovation policy, there
is one point of agreement: technological advancement matters.45
45

See Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in CIVIL LAW
ECONOMICS 134 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (citation
omitted) (“Robert Solow demonstrated that technological advancement and increased
human capital of the labor force accounted for most (between 80 and 90 percent) of the
annual productivity increase in the US economy between 1909 and 1949, with
increases in the capital/labor ratio accounting for the remainder. . . . It is now widely
recognized that technological advancement and enhanced human capital are the
principal engines of economic growth in the United States and other industrialized
countries.”); see also Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2
AND
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In a free market with its emphasis on competition (i.e., copying
the success of others), there is agreement that we need to “do
something,”46 since “a competitive market may not give enough
incentive to invest in knowledge . . . .”47 With competitors
aggressively copying ideas, the market price for technological
information will plummet to its near-zero marginal cost.48 The
resulting market revenue for the original creator “will not cover
the costs of developing the [information], and therefore the
market will not work.”49 Without “do[ing] something . . . ,
everyone will want to be an imitator, not an inventor.”50
Yet, while there is agreement that we should do
something, agreeing on what we should do is much more
controversial. Broadly speaking, this underproduction problem
has engendered a number of alternative solutions—e.g., prizes,
research contracts, patent regimes, and, more recently,
commons-based production.51 Of these, some worry about the
“principal drawback” of such government prizes and contracts:
“that they require the government to value innovation, or to
decide which projects are likely to produce value in the
future.”52 It is thought that a system of exclusive rights can
avoid some of these informational problems. Indeed, the U.S.
Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to provide for a
patent system that promotes progress in the “useful [a]rts” by
granting exclusive rights to inventors for their discoveries.53 As
a result, much of the legal commentary has focused only on
such exclusive rights regimes.54 This article is no exception.
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1476-1570 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007) (discussing Solow’s work); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 699 & n.4 (2001) (same).
46
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 8.
47
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 58 (2004).
48
Id. at 35.
49
Id.
50
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 8.
51
See Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents,
Prizes, and Research Contracts, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 696 (1983); see also Amy
Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 985-87 (2012) (revisiting those alternate options
and Brian Wright’s earlier work).
52
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 45 (2001).
53
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have [p]ower . . . [T]o
promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to
[a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and
[d]iscoveries . . . .”).
54
Though further below it has some thoughts on the suitability of these
alternatives. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 58 (concluding that “reward” is to
“some degree” “linked to the social value of the invention”); WARD S. BOWMAN, JR.,
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Though there are a number of normative theories
explaining this exclusive rights approach for patent law,55 they
are all variations on one basic story.56 The “classic utilitarian
theory of patent law,”57 a narrative that we have used “for 200
years,”58 aims to “encourage [inventors] to invest in research and
development by the prospect that their invention will be
patented.”59 In other words, “the government issues you a patent;
the patent gives you the right to exclude; you can use that right
to exclude competitors in order to raise your price, and
therefore make more money; and that fact in turn gives you an
incentive to create.”60
That story is quite “simple.”61 We aim to get the optimal
amount of innovation by artificially making it more profitable
through granting patents.62 Our normative aim is “inducement”63
by way of exclusive rights with occasional “limited market
power.”64 Patent policy debates revolve around the modulation of
patent scope and duration so as to produce that correct amount
of reward and inducement.
In 1934, economist Arnold Plant described this narrative
and the patent system generally as “a subsidy for invention.”65 And
now, eighty years later, we still think about the patent system that
way. Recent work alternatively describes the system as
a mechanism the State uses to induce innovation . . . , property-like
rights used by inventors to collect payment from society as

PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 38 (1973) (“The
patent system has an advantage over a system of government grants in that it is
consumer oriented. There is no payoff unless consumers deem the invention worth
paying for.”).
55
See KIEFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 66.
56
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 68 (observing that the various theories
of patent law “are not so much alternatives to this classic incentive-to-invent story as
they are efforts to understand how the incentive works in practice and to balance the
costs and benefits in the light of economic evidence about how innovation and patent
incentives work.”).
57
Id.
58
Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patent in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 139 (2000).
59
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 68.
60
Lemley, supra note 58, at 139.
61
Id.
62
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 66; see also BOWMAN, supra note 54,
at x (“Without patent protection, patent law assumes, rapid copying by others (who
have not incurred the cost) would greatly diminish wealth-creating activity, to the
detriment of the community. Invention would be underrewarded.”).
63
Kapczynski, supra note 51, at 986 & n.57 (referring to the patent system as
inducing works).
64
SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 58.
65
BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 19 (describing Arnold Plant’s view of patent law).
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inducement for their innovative efforts, . . . [or] a mode of
cataloguing which third-parties should provide recompense to the
inventor so as to guarantee the appropriate level of R & D and
commercialization incentives . . . .66

Patent law purposefully grants patent holders the ability to set
up a toll,67 whose aggregate revenue will optimally incentivize
inventive activity.
Yet though facially simple, that narrative creates serious
costs as patent law aims to cure this supply-side problem.68
Because of the nonrival nature of information, it is widely
thought that “there is no efficiency reason to deprive anyone of
use . . . . [and if the price for the information were zero,] everyone
would be served, and access would be efficient.”69 If the price for a
piece of information were non-zero (as it must be if patent law
hopes to provide any incentive), then an inefficient use of the
information would be assumed. Nobel Prize-winning economist
Kenneth Arrow described such exclusive rights schemes:
[I]nformation obtained, say a new method of production, should,
from the welfare point of view, be available free of charge (apart
from the costs of transmitting information). This insures optimal
utilization of the information but of course provides no incentive for
investment in research . . . . In a free enterprise economy, inventive
activity is supported by using the invention to create property rights;
precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization
of the information.70

This Gordian knot is the incentive versus access paradox.71 As
Clarissa Long nicely put it, “[t]he result is that without legal
protection, not enough information will be produced; but with
legal protection, not enough information will be used.”72
Patent policy is a balancing of the benefits of the
incentive scheme against the costs of exclusion. A great deal of
hand-wringing has focused on whether patent law has made this
66

Ted M. Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), (manuscript at 18-19), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1932834.
67
See SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 34 (describing patents as a toll).
68
Id. at 35-36.
69
Id.
70
Arrow, supra note 26, at 616-17 (emphasis added). Arrow won the Nobel
Prize in 1972. See The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of
Alfred Nobel 1972, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/
laureates/1972/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
71
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 488-89 (1996) (providing a thorough exploration of
the incentive versus access debate).
72
Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 632 (2002).
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compromise wisely.73 It is, as put by economist Suzanne
Scotchmer, “a tortured solution to the problem of providing a
public good.”74 It is not thought to fit nicely with the rest of the
market system: “[T]he whole point of the patent system is to
provide legal rights that alter the market and thereby induce
changes in resource allocations.”75 The patent system is a
“deliberate government intervention[] in the market—a sort of
mercantilist economic policy for artificially stimulating
innovation.”76
B.

The Failure and Oddities of the Incentive Narrative

The above-described normative theory, though it serves
as the basis for all utilitarian patent theories,77 is a failure on
many different levels. As detailed below, its primary failure is
its inability to justify the patent system. Related to that
failure, this section further describes other curious features of
that system relevant for contrasting the normative theory
against the market for inventions narrative developed in later
sections. In particular, the incentive narrative is an absolutist
system of infringement, devoid of both a concept of harm and
the potential for a more nuanced system. In addition, this
narrative develops a very curious concept of patent transactions
where naked exclusion and permission, as opposed to useful
technologies, are the heart of the exchange.
1. Intractable Indeterminacy
The biggest failure of the incentive narrative is its
inability to provide a satisfactory justification for the patent
system. As described above, the existing normative theory aims
to balance the costs and benefits of exclusion. Yet, identifying
and then quantifying both the benefits and the costs of the
exclusion has turned out to be nearly impossible. It is a
73

See BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 50-51; id. at xi (focusing on “the patent reward
system in terms of whether it is likely to underreward or overreward invention.”).
74
SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 34.
75
Golden, supra note 25, at 508-09.
76
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 8.
77
Prospect theory and its related commercialization variants are sometimes
seen as distinct from the more reward-oriented theories. See Edmund W. Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977); see also
KIEFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 68 n.170. Yet these are often seen as incentive theories
where the incentive is the incentive to commercialize as opposed to incentive to invent
or disclose. Id. As such they suffer from the same intractability as the more dominant
incentive to invent and disclose theories.
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problem that “is peculiarly unsusceptible to empirical proof,”78
where “the trade-offs . . . are much more extreme and difficult
to measure. No one knows what the optimal duration of
patent . . . protection should be, or whether there should be
different periods of protection in different areas of enterprise.
Some even doubt whether we need any protection at all.”79 The
economics of the patent system and information more generally
has remained “extraordinarily indeterminate.”80 The fact is that
the current patent narrative “has never developed a consistent,
usable theory for determining the appropriate duration and
scope of IP rights. . . . Determining the optimal amount of IP
protection is exceedingly difficult.”81 Fritz Machlup famously
provided the following disheartening conclusion:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to
recommend instituting one. But since we have had [one] for a long
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.82

In short, the basic incentive narrative “has some serious
problems,”83 and it is time “to question the classic incentive
theory.”84 One solution would be to just try harder85 to work out
the cost-benefit balance, but “finding the right balance between
[appropriation versus access] has proven to be one of the most
difficult questions that government policy has ever had to
face.”86 In fact, I, along with others, fear it may be impossible.87
As a result, “[w]e don’t, in fact, know for sure what impact
patents have on innovation.”88 Without proof, many question

78

BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 48-51.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP & CHRISTINA BOHANNON, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT 46 (2012).
80
BOYLE, supra note 19, at 41.
81
HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 7.
82
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW
OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM] (prepared by Fritz Machlup).
83
Lemley, supra note 58, at 148.
84
Id. at 142.
85
See Lemley, supra note 24, 1067 (noting that “[h]ard as it is to get the
balance right, we will never do it if we simply stop trying”).
86
HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 404.
87
See Liivak, supra note 37, at 1173-76; ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2-3 (2011).
88
Lemley, supra note 58, at 139.
79
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the patent system and stress alternatives.89 Others have even
called for outright abandonment of the system.90
2. Behavioral Coarseness without a Concept of Harm
In addition to its intractable indeterminacy, the current
narrative is conspicuously coarse. Though certainly the
narrative involves a complex balancing of interests in
designing the system, it provides little nuanced behavioral
guidance to patent holders once those patents are issued. In
fact, the current narrative gives the patent holder rather blunt
and direct instruction: use the exclusion in the patent to make
money. Justice Douglas noted that “[a] patent empowers the
owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the
leverage of that monopoly.”91 In other words, “once a patent has
been issued the patentee can be expected to utilize the
exclusive rights he has been granted to maximize his reward.”92
There is a similar absolutism regarding infringement.
Conceptualized as a toll that produces incentives, excusing any
infringer threatens to upset Congress’s balance of incentives.
The result is a patent narrative that inherently portrays
enforcement and infringement in an absolute and noncontextual light.
Though many might lament the rise of patent trolls, the
current narrative provides little ability to criticize that
behavior. The only recourse is to criticize the patents as
improperly issued. But for properly issued patents, the current
narrative expects aggressive assertion. In their recent book on
intellectual property, Bohannon and Hovenkamp highlight this
coarse nature of the current narrative. As a reform, they focus
on the lack of a harm requirement in patent infringement
actions. They suggest, “[a]s a first step in their own reform
journeys, drafters of the IP laws need to develop a more
disciplined conception of IP injury . . . which would
require . . . demonstrable injury . . . .”93 Not only would a harm
requirement enable the fine-tuning of patent exclusion and
remedies, it would also produce a narrative with better public
relations than the current aggressive assertion mode of the
89

See Kapczynski, supra note 51, at 973 n.7 (revisiting the alternative modes
previously explored by Wright).
90
See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 15, at 7.
91
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
92
BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 22.
93
HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 51 (internal quotations omitted).
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incentive narrative.94 As long as we are using the current
incentive narrative, however, I doubt there is conceptual room
for a nuanced concept of harm.
3. Markets for Exclusion Rather than for Technology
Another oddity of the current narrative is the nature of
its transactions. As a general matter, “market transactions are
arms-length, anonymous, and typically involve an exchange of
a good for money.”95 Surely, when we make the leap from
tangible property to intellectual property, we expect the “goods”
to become less tangible and more ephemeral, but, in the
current narrative, the “goods” vanish altogether.96 Transactions
in the incentive narrative are exchanges of money, not for a
useful “thing,” but instead for a promise not to sue.97 This
outcome is a direct result of viewing the patent system as a
mechanism that sets up tolls to provide incentives, and those
transactions are becoming a highly visible part of the modern
patent system. This has led to “the development of what [Mark
Lemley] call[s] ‘licensing shops,’ that is, significant corporate
entities with little or no business purpose other than to
accumulate and license patents . . . what they mostly seem to
‘produce’ are patents and patent licenses.”98
Such a market in “naked exclusion” should strike us as
quite odd. Despite ultimately aiming to “promote the progress
of the useful arts,” technology exchange is not an obligation
placed on patent holders.99 In fact, the transactions need not
include any technological exchange. Nonetheless, some have
aimed to improve the patent system by reducing the frictions in

94

See Liivak, supra note 37, at 1176-79 (describing inherent animosity
created by current incentive narrative).
95
ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY 4 (2001).
96
See generally Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights,
20 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1477, 1499 (2005) (quoting Thomas W. Merrill & Henry Smith,
What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L. J. 357, 359 (2001))
(drawing a conceptual picture of “normal” market transactions where goods are exchanged
and where the legal rights that protect those goods automatically move with the goods).
97
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP.
75, 95 (2005) (concluding that a patent gives the holder “a right to try to exclude”).
98
Lemley, supra note 58, at 140-41.
99
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423 (1908); see
also Oskar Liivak & Eduardo Penalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent
Law, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
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that market.100 Indeed, one of the primary defenses of patent
trolls has been their injection of liquidity into this “market.”101
Meanwhile, markets in technology and inventions look
and feel quite different. In these latter two markets, patent
exclusion surely plays a critical background role. Yet, their
central focus is transactions, where payment is exchanged for
technological information or inventions, respectively. They
surely involve an exchange of legal relations as well, but these
are a consequence of (and background features of) the exchange
of the useful technological “thing.” Such markets look much
more like traditional property rather than some industrial
policy that induces wealth transfers.102 These markets and their
transactions involve a “thing”—the technology or the
invention—and they involve property rights, which surround
that asset and provide a “field of legal protection” around it.103
The current “thing”-less market for exclusion has
created a system where interest in the patent system may stem
not from any real interest in inventions or progress in the
useful arts, but instead in rent-seeking via exclusion. As
relayed by Colleen Chien, there is growing sense that
“[i]nvesting in invention is for schmucks.”104 The implication is
that the smart money no longer invents but rather just collects
and asserts patents. It is hard to imagine a functioning patent
system where such a disconnect can exist, yet that disconnect
is the natural result of our coarse patent narrative.
Consequently, the current narrative leads to a patent
system with an absolutist focus on exclusion, devoid of a focus
on useful technology and its dissemination. If, indeed, the
economic case could be made for that strange system, I would
learn to live with it; but as shown above, the patent system
certainly cannot make such claims of justification and I doubt
it ever will. Beyond failing to provide a stable theoretical
100

See Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 258 (2007).
101
See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketpalce: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 311,
(2011) (noting that “growth in the patent marketplace, accompanied by an increase in
liquidity, transactions, and business models for buyers, sellers, and intermediaries”).
102
See Liivak, supra note 37, at 1179-82.
103
Merges, supra note 96, at 1499 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104
Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls 19-20 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch.
Law Working Paper No. 09-12, 2012) (quoting Nicolas White, Comment to Now that IP
Is Mainstream, Let’s Not Mess This Once in a Lifetime Opportunity Up, INTELL. ASSET
MGMT. (July 6, 2012, 10:23 PM), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=
b0610bab-d371-4401-bd6f-6b12368b8eb0) (internal quotation marks omitted), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146251.

2013]

ESTABLISHING AN ISLAND OF PATENT SANITY

1353

foundation, the current incentive narrative leaves ample room
for patent trolls to plausibly deny societal harm and blame.
II.

A MARKET FOR INVENTIONS, NOT FOR TECHNOLOGY AND
NOT FOR NAKED EXCLUSION

Intractability, though disheartening, does not doom the
patent system (though it should doom the incentive-based
narrative). There is an alternative: if the cost-benefit balance is
impossible to resolve, then maybe we should just stop trying to
solve it (at least directly). Instead, we should try to design our
patent system around a narrative where this elusive optimal
allocation is an outcome of the system, rather than as a
necessary but unknowable policy input.
Certainly such a wish list seems fanciful; yet, consider
for a moment that despite its own imperfections, our private
property market system performs exactly this feat every day.
The private property system does not need to know the right
amount of shoe stores or Thai restaurants to build as a policy
input; those levels are an output, a result of system design.105
Furthermore, though every item of tangible property comes
with a powerful exclusionary shield, that exclusion ultimately
should not prevent the highest-valued user from utilizing the
tangible resource. These are strong exclusive rights, but we
don’t suffer the same exclusion costs as in intellectual property.
Finally, while the traditional property system is certainly not
perfect,106 especially considering distributional issues, it does
enjoy something that has eluded patent law: strong economic
justification, stability, and, perhaps most important for a
property system, widespread acceptance.
This section explores the possibility of building a patent
narrative along lines similar to that employed for the private
property market: socially beneficial behavior driven not by
government-created incentives, but rather by private decisionmaking backed by property rights.107 Despite its allure and
simplicity, there are thought to be long-standing obstacles to
105

See Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A
Transactional Model, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1174 (2008) (arguing that a transactional
model “permit[s] the exposition of a model that need not rely on ex ante assumptions
about optimal R&D expenditures”).
106
In addition to distributional issues, there are also problems associated with
optimality and the theory of the second best. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s
Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 390 (2008).
107
In earlier work I began sketching a research plan for searching for such a
system. See generally Liivak, supra note 37, at 1167-68.
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such a simple institution for information exchange. Though
agreeing with those objections generally, this section presents
an example where in fact those objections do not hold and
concludes that a system of socially beneficial resource allocation
can result from private decision-making and voluntary
exchange. As will be explored in greater detail in the next
section, that exceptional example is one member of a general set,
where the aim is not market exchange of technological
information generally, but rather the narrower (and critically
different) goal of voluntary exchange of inventions.
A.

Structuring an Economic Narrative for a Technology
Market

Others have already developed foundational work,
pointing out the important benefits the patent system provides
in enabling markets for technological exchange.108 Robert
Merges,109 Asish Arora,110 Paul Heald,111 Henry Smith,112 and
others113 have all put emphasis on the patent system’s role in
supporting a market for technology. In summarizing much of
this work, Merges lauds intellectual property rights for
“serv[ing] as the starting points for negotiations and exchange,

108

See generally MERGES, supra note 87, at 154; ARORA ET AL., supra note 95,
at 261 (“[I]ntellectual property rights encourage the rise of a market for technology.”).
109
See generally Merges, supra note 96 (emphasizing the role intellectual
property rights play in encouraging transactions).
110
See generally Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms,
Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004).
111
See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST.
L.J. 473, 489 (2005) (arguing from a transaction cost perspective that “[t]he patent
form enables the potential transferor to share an information asset without fear of
misappropriation while assembling the complex team necessary to commercialize a
new product”).
112
Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1795 (2007).
113
See, e.g., David J. Teece, Technological Know-How, Property Rights, and
Enterprise Boundaries: The Contribution of Arora and Merges, 14 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 1237, 1239 (2005) (“For far too long, the debate about the patent system has
neglected consideration of how patents enable enterprises and individual inventors to
specialize and capture the economies of specialization.”) (parenthetical omitted); Nancy
T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter, Licensing in the Theory of Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON.
237, 238 (1985) (“[T]he role of patents in our model is not the traditional role of
creating monopoly monopolies by prohibiting exploitation of informational spillovers.
Rather, by protecting property rights, patents here open the market for trading
technological information.”); ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 262 (“Point to the role of
patents in facilitating transactions in technology. This role of patents has largely been
ignored in informal economic analysis, where the focus has been on the trade-off
between the ex-ante incentives to innovate the ex post advantages of innovation
diffusion.”).
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[and] setting in motion the great resource-allocating machinery
so heartily lauded by theorists such as McCloskey and Sen.”114
Though I agree with those earlier works, there is still
one critical element that is missing. Many of us think that such
transactions are likely socially beneficial, yet that optimistic
outlook is still ultimately grounded in “faith”115—and that just
doesn’t seem to be good enough anymore. Despite identifying
positive aspects of the patent system, the simple fact is that we
still cannot make a strong argument that supports such a
system116: “try as we might, law and economics scholars have
never established an efficiency-based (or utilitarian)
justification for the field. There is no lock-solid proof that
overall social welfare would decline if IP protection were
suddenly removed.”117
The patent system just does not have an accepted
economic framework like the one used to justify the market in
tangible goods. As Hovenkamp and Bohannon recently noted,
there is substantially “more consensus about the legal framework
for encouraging traditional competition than about the framework
for facilitating optimum innovation.”118 In particular, they write
that the relative incoherence of intellectual property (in relation
to antitrust and price competition) stems from the well-accepted
“basic outline of the requirements for competition” and
intellectual property’s lack of such a model and consensus.119
One problem is that much of existing transaction-based
discussion still situates itself in the incentive-based narrative.
In other words, beneficial technological transactions are seen
as one of the many positive behaviors that are induced by the
patent. This article aims to look at the transactions on their
own, rather than having its benefits burdened by the
intractable costs associated with the incentive view and its
absolute view of exclusion. By doing so, the article hopes to
make claims about the transaction model for patents that can
alone justify at least part of the patent system.
The purpose of the following sections (and, indeed, the
purpose of this article) is to develop that economic framework
114

MERGES, supra note 87, at 155.
See BOYLE, supra note 19, at 253.
116
See ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 279 (“Intellectual property rights are a
sine qua non for the development of such markets. But given the nature of knowledge,
property rights (such as patents) in knowledge can create problems.”).
117
MERGES, supra note 87, at 6.
118
HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 45.
119
Id. at 45-47.
115
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for a market of inventions and then to identify the patent
system necessary to support such a market. Yet, the aim is
more than to build an accepted framework for the patent
system that is modeled on the traditional market. Rather, the
aim is to integrate the patent system as a natural extension of
the price system and the traditional market, and to end patent
system exceptionalism.120
To fully integrate the patent system into the broader
economic framework, it is worth recalling the overall purpose of
economics. As put by Lionel Robbins, “Economics is the science
which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends
and scarce means which have alternate uses.”121 As has long
been recognized, both the traditional market and the patent
system share the same basic goal: “the efficient allocation of
scarce resources for those products and services consumers
value.”122 For patent law, though technological knowledge itself
is not rivalrously consumed, scholars have emphasized for
some time that the patent system—as a form of private
property—needs to focus on the efficient allocation of the scarce
resources—e.g., time and lab equipment consumed in creating
the invention.123
To understand the form of the patent system’s economic
justification and how it fits into the broader economic
framework, it is also worth recalling the form of the economic
support for the free market in tangible goods. Economists have
used a two-stage argument to justify the allocation of scarce
tangible goods through the voluntary market.124 First, economists
developed the notion of efficiency, an overall “top-level” condition
describing the optimal allocation and distribution of those
tangible scarce resources.125 Second, economists have shown that
this optimal allocation can be reached through voluntary,
private exchanges guided by the price system.126 Based on this
socially beneficial and voluntary exchange narrative, property
rights aim to prevent any harmful acts that would interfere
with that voluntary exchange. Though most think it cannot be
120

See Liivak, supra note 37, at 1169-73 (arguing for ending the patent
exceptionalism where patents are seen as interfering with the existing market rather
than naturally extending that market).
121
LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
ECONOMIC SCIENCE 16 (2d ed. 1945).
122
BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 13.
123
See Kitch, supra note 77, at 266; Smith supra note 112, at 1745.
124
See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 36, at 62.
125
CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 28, at 23.
126
See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 36, at 62.
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done, this article argues that the same methodology can be
extended to structure and justify at least part of the current
patent system.
B.

Allocating Scarce Resources Toward Creating
Information

In building an economic model for allocating scarce
resources toward creating and distributing useful technology,
the first question is whether there exists an analogous “topdown” condition that can identify when and where scarce
resources should be consumed; and indeed, economists have
defined that condition. Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s,
economists like Howard Bowen and Erik Lindahl worked on
the more general problem of allocating resources toward
production of public goods. In the 1950s, Paul Samuelson
continued that work and described the proper allocation of
resources for the creation of a public good, now known as the
“Samuelson condition.” It states that resources should be
directed toward production and dissemination of a public good
up to the optimal point—that is, when the collective preference
for that last increment of public good equals the preference for
the private good that could have been made from the scarce
resources consumed in creating that last increment of the
public good.127 Just as the efficiency condition for tangible goods
could guide a benevolent social planner in the allocation of
private goods, so could the Samuelson condition for public
goods. Thus, as a theoretical matter, we can describe when
scarce resources should be consumed for creating and
disseminating technological public goods. The critical question
is whether private decision-making can arrive at those socially
beneficial allocations. In Samuelson’s words, “The solution
‘exists’; the problem is how to ‘find’ it.”128
Economic theory has shown that voluntary exchange of
tangible goods in equilibrium leads to the optimal use of those
127

Samuelson, supra note 29, at 388. The Samuelson condition is often written as:
n

 MRS

i
zy

≥ MRT zy

i=1

where MRTzy is the alternative uses for the scarce resources that will be consumed in
i
creating the invention z and MRS zy is the ith person’s preference for the public good z
relative to those alternative uses (i.e., relative to private good y); see also CORNES &
SANDLER, supra note 28, at 23 (using the notation adopted here).
128
Samuelson, supra note 29, at 389.
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goods.129 Could a similar narrative be developed for the creation
and distribution of technology? As to finding such a voluntary
mechanism for satisfying the Samuelson condition, the
structure of the condition itself offers a tantalizing possibility
that private decision-making could be the answer. Assume
some private actor with the capability to create a public good
and to estimate the scarce resources that will be consumed in
creating the public good. If the private actor could collect the
benefit provided to each user of the public good, then a profitmotivated private decision-maker would undertake projects
creating public goods only when it would be the socially beneficial
use of those resources. Such a scheme, driven by private profit
motives and private decision-making, could lead to a Pareto
optimal production of public goods.130 But, as will be detailed
below, most have concluded that this possibility is a mirage and
that such private decision-making for the creation and sale of
information will be fatally defective. So what is the problem?
C.

Objections to Private Decision-Making and Markets for
Information

Though private decision-making is an alluring solution
to the public goods problem, there are a number of objections,
including towering, Nobel Prize-winning objections. Indeed, the
conventional view is that such a market for technological
information would not work. It is thought that the exotic world
of nonrival ideas is just too different from tangible goods,
making the tangible market’s relatively simple and accepted
narrative inapposite. In fact, as one comprehensive survey
acknowledged, “there is very little on how a market in knowledge
would function, other than the appreciation that such markets
would be characterized by a number of imperfections.”131 While
Paul Samuelson broadly objected to a private market for public
goods, Kenneth Arrow presented more specific objections to a
private market for the public good of information.

129

See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 36, at 62 (discussing tangible goods
such as “food, clothing, and shelter”).
130
See id.
131
ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 1; see also David J. Teece, Towards an
Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 49 (1982)
(“Markets do not work well as the institutional mode for trading knowhow.”); Teece,
supra note 113, at 1237 (focusing attention of problems with the transfer of tacit
knowledge).
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In the initial articulation of the Samuelson condition,
Samuelson noted that for private goods, there is indeed a
decentralized “analogue calculating machine”—that is, the
private market with price competition that reaches the
optimality condition for private goods.132 Immediately thereafter,
though, he forcefully argued that as to public goods and the
Samuelson condition, “no decentralized pricing system can serve
to determine optimally these levels of collective consumption.”133
He argued, “it is in the selfish interest of each person to give
false signals, to pretend to have less interest in a given
collective consumption activity than he really has . . . .”134 Those
false signals prevent the public goods’ aggregate revenue from
reflecting its true collective value and thwart an optimal
private decision-making system. As a result of this motivation
“to snatch some selfish benefit in a way not possible under the
self-policing competitive pricing of private goods . . . it [is]
impossible for [the theory of public goods] . . . to have that special
pattern . . . which makes laissez-faire competition even
theoretically possible as an analogue computer.”135 Though
alternatives have been explored, the inability “to induce
consumers to reveal their marginal valuations”136 remains the
primary obstacle and continues to “make[] it all but impossible to
determine the optimal level of production for any public good.”137
To make matters worse, Samuelson’s objections are not
the only obstacle. In one of the most influential articles to
examine the economics of information, Kenneth Arrow gave
several additional rationales for doubting the feasibility of the
market mechanism to provide optimal levels of investment in
information production. His article focused on “the determination
of optimal resource allocation for invention” by “perfect
competition.”138 Though using the term “invention,” his analysis
was very broad, examining “the production of knowledge”
generally.139 The focus of the analysis was on “the special nature
of information”140 as compared to private goods, and he concluded
that “a free enterprise economy [would] underinvest in invention
132

Samuelson, supra note 29, at 388.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
134
Id. at 388-89 (emphasis omitted).
135
Id. at 389.
136
See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A
Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 639 (2007).
137
Id.
138
Arrow, supra note 26, at 609.
139
Id.
140
BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 23; see also Arrow, supra note 26, at 609.
133
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and research (as compared with an ideal) . . . .”141 He reached that
conclusion by highlighting that information possesses, among
other problems, characteristics that challenge the market model:
“inappropriability[] and uncertainty.”142
As to inappropriability, Arrow concluded that “[i]n the
absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot . . . simply
sell information on the open market.”143 On this point he made
two observations. First, “[a]ny one purchaser can destroy the
monopoly . . . .”144 This is the standard point about the threat
posed by pirates. Second, remaining one of the most well-known
arguments in the article, Arrow noted that efforts to sell
information entail “a fundamental paradox in the determination
of demand for information; its value for the purchaser is not
known until he has the information, but then he has in effect
acquired it without cost.”145 This point is widely cited and is now
known as “Arrow’s Information Paradox.”146
In light of these problems with inappropriability, Arrow
suggested something should be done—i.e., “suitable legal
measures” involving “property rights.”147 Though they help,
Arrow argued that even with those property rights, the market
would remain suboptimal because of remaining problems of
inappropriability, intractability, and uncertainty.148 Arrow
argued, “there are obviously enormous difficulties in defining
in any sharp way an item of information and differentiating it
from other similar sounding items.”149 He lamented that
“[p]atent laws would have to be unimaginably complex and
subtle to permit such appropriation on a large scale.”150
Lastly, Arrow argued that uncertainty would plague an
information market. He first noted that uncertainty is part of
most enterprises and that various risk-shifting mechanisms
exist, but then argued that uncertainty would be especially
problematic for “highly risky business activities, including
invention.”151 He noted that “[i]nformation is not only the
product of inventive activity, it is also an input . . . ,” and as a
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Arrow, supra note 26, at 619.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 27, at 229 n.4.
Arrow, supra note 26, at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 613.
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result, “the value of information for use in developing further
information is much more conjectural . . . .”152 These factors
together led Arrow to conclude that, even if backed with
property rights, “a free enterprise economy [would] underinvest
in invention . . . ,” and that there is therefore “a strong case for
centralized decision making.”153
D.

A Market for Inventions: A Constructive Proof

In light of the above objections, if the goal of the patent
system is to guide the allocation of resources toward the
creation of technological information generally, then private
decision-making may not work, and patent theory is destined
to slog on in its incentive-versus-access indeterminism. Many
in fact do see the patent system as a standard incentive to
generate technological information. Ward Bowman argued,
“[t]he product of a patent is information.”154 Suzanne Scotchmer
described the system as giving “patent holders . . . an almost
absolute right to control uses of the knowledge they have
created.”155 Ed Kitch argued patents alleviate the “fear that the
fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable information
appropriable by competitors.”156 As long as patent theory conceives
the goal of the patent system so broadly—as a general system
that incentivizes generation of technological information—then,
in light of Arrow’s and Samuelson’s objections, a solely marketbased narrative may well be problematic. When so broadly
conceived, private decision-making will likely not be able to
provide the decentralized “analogue calculating machine”
necessary for allocating resources to innovation. We are stuck
with the incentive-access paradigm despite its indeterminism
because we just do not think we have a choice.
But this article argues that we are asking too much of
the patent system. Samuelson was considering the public goods
problem generally when he “emphasized” the problems with
private provision.157 And Arrow, though using the term
“invention,” focused on information generation.158 Perhaps some
narrower view might still work. Might we find some exception
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 618.
Id. at 619.
BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 17.
SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 82-83.
Kitch, supra note 77, at 276 (emphasis added).
Samuelson, supra note 29, at 389.
See Arrow, supra note 26, at 619.
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that was overlooked? First, Samuelson concluded that “it may
turn out to be pure luck that within the general domain [of
information,] there happen[s] to be a subsector with the
‘simple’ properties of traditional economics.”159 Arrow pointed
the way, noting that “underinvestment will be greater for basic
research.”160 Rather than focusing on information generally,
perhaps we should instead focus on something narrower where
the market might work. Fairly late-stage, well-developed
technology may be that narrower, workable regime.
Both Arrow’s and Samuelson’s objections to a private
provision are, to a large extent, rooted in the difficulty in
determining a potential user’s valuation of a public good. For
Samuelson it was one of strategic under-revelation of the
valuation, and for Arrow it was one of valuation uncertainty of
the user. What if this could be overcome? What would happen
if creators and users both knew the valuation? Would the
outcome of private provision satisfy the Samuelson condition?
Economists have examined this issue and have in fact
shown that under such conditions, an optimal allocation of
resources can result.161 Furthermore, it should be emphasized that
under these conditions, “no potential customers of the public good
are denied access . . . .”162 Together, these are two highly appealing
characteristics, yet “the informational requirements of [the] model
are extremely demanding.”163 As a result, “[a]ll are uncomfortable
with the assumption . . . [of] complete knowledge . . . and [ability
to] tailor . . . different . . . price[s].”164 Despite worries that such
model assumptions are “extremely demanding,”165 this part
provides one relevant example where we can expect those
stringent conditions to be satisfied. This part will focus on a
particular type of invention: a cost-saving process.
Assume an industry produces a single output—a
product—as a result from a single public domain process that
transforms a single input. Economists describe such a package
of technological know-how as a production plan.166 Assume the
159

Id.
Id.
See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 28, at 243-47 (discussing the analysis
in Earl A. Thompson, The Perfectly Competitive Production of Collective Goods, 50 REV.
ECON. STAT. 1 (1968)).
162
Id. at 247.
163
Id. at 248.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
See generally DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 233-64
(1990). At times economists refer to these production plans as netput vectors. See id. at 234.
160
161
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industry is using a well-known process where α units of input
are consumed to produce a single unit of output.167
Now presume a person knowledgeable about these
processes believes, with some expenditure of scarce resources
and labor, she can improve this industrial process. This person,
whom we will call the inventor, confidently knows that she can
consume some of her scarce resources (principally her own time)
in order to create a more efficient process for producing the same
output. In other words, this new process can create the same
unit of output more efficiently using fewer units of input.168
As discussed above, before addressing private property
and commodification for a market, consider the social costs and
benefits of this endeavor. Could an omniscient social planner
determine when the inventor should consume those scarce
resources in order to produce that cost-saving invention? As
discussed earlier, the Samuelson condition provides exactly
that determination.169
Now the critical question, which has generally been
answered in the negative, is whether a market institution driven
by private decision-making could make those same socially
beneficial decisions. The critical point is that, though the
objections from Samuelson and Arrow likely apply to
technological information in general, they do not apply in this case.
Valuation can be confidently made for each industry
participant. A firm that produces qi units of output using the
new process will value the newer process as qi pinput (β - α).170
This is their cost savings from using the new process instead of
the older, public domain process.171 Each firm knows that
whenever they want to produce a unit of the output, they will
benefit by using the newer process. There is no room to
strategically underreport their valuation because both the
inventor and the firms using the processes know how to value
the process. A contract can be drawn up where the inventor can
offer the process to anyone who can utilize it and pricing can be
set on a royalty per unit of output produced. Though I will
Such a process can be described by the netput vector (α, 1) where α < 0. See
id. at 234-36.
168
Using the earlier notation, that new process could be described by a new
netput vector (β, 1) for creating the same output where α< β <0.
169
See supra Part II.B.
170
i
Using the economic notation from above MRS zy = qi pinput (β - α).
171
Blair & Cotter, supra note 52, at 40 n.194 (noting that “the maximum
payment that a willing licensee would pay is the difference between the maximum
profit he would earn from using the invention and the maximum profit he would earn
without the invention”).
167
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discuss exclusive rights below,172 negotiations between
inventors and users need not run into Arrow’s Information
Paradox.173 As long as firms are assured that the process “works
for its intended purpose”—i.e., producing one unit of output for
every β unit of input—then firms can form a valuation of the
process without knowing exactly how the process works. If a
firm wants to use the new process, they must obtain a license
from the inventor.174 The inventor knows that the new process is
worth qi pinput (β - α) to each firm, and can expect the industry
participants to agree to a license as long as the range of the
licensing fee—on a price per unit of output—is within γpinput (β α) where 0<γ<1.175
With that valuation for each firm, the inventor can
predict the licensing program’s overall revenue. If the industry
is producing Q units of output in total, the inventor can expect
γpinput Q (β - α) total revenue if every user adopts the new
process. The inventor will undertake creating this cost-saving
process whenever it is her best option—that is, whenever γ Q pinput
(β - α) ≥ c, where c is the highest price for the alternative uses of
those scarce resources that are consumed in creating the new
process. That decision-making coincides with society’s choice for
those resources: a privately motivated inventor will make the
decision to allocate resources toward creating inventions only
when society would concur with that resource allocation.
This section showed that there exists at least this one
example of a special package of technological information that
can be valued and exchanged in a market. Importantly for that
example, inventors allocate resources to these cost-saving
processes when that is the best use of those scarce resources.
Such an undertaking is an activity of unambiguous social
benefit that is driven by private decision-making, and no one is
172

See infra Part III.B.
See Arrow, supra note 26, at 615.
174
Implicit in this model is the assumption that transactions are money in
exchange for the use of the process alone. The model does not reflect or allow for
transactions where money is exchanged for promises not to license to other
competitors. They are non-exclusive licenses for the process alone without the ability to
pay in order to prevent others from using the process.
175
See Darlyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to
Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 640 (2010)
(discussing the theoretical default value for, γ). The parameter γ ranges from 0 to 1 and
it represents the fraction of the revenue from the acceptable range that goes to the
inventor versus the consuming firm. The parameter reflects how successful an inventor
is in keeping the surplus for themselves. In the absence of competition from other
inventors I think it is safe to assume that the initial inventor will keep the whole
surplus (i.e. γ=1).
173
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denied use of the invention. The next section expands this one
specific example to the entire class of inventions and explores
the patent system necessary to support such a market in
inventions. This result alone is quite interesting. It suggests
that, despite our worries, resources dedicated toward creating
inventions could be allocated by private decision-making alone,
and again, any firm that wants to use the new process can do
so. No user is left out.
III.

A PATENT SYSTEM FOR BACKING A MARKET FOR
INVENTIONS

This part considers two issues: what exclusive property
rights are needed to protect this market from third-party harm,
and how to generalize the quite small “island” of cost-saving
processes (discussed above) to the more substantial “island” of
inventions. As to the exclusive rights needs, though the
transactions are driven by private decision-making, such
behavior “do[es] not arise simply because the benefits of having
them outweigh the costs. They require institutions to support
them.”176 This part explores the institution177—that is, the patent
system—necessary to support such socially beneficial activity.
In particular, though the incentives for creation and
dissemination are derived directly from exchange with those
that can use the process, the patent system must structure
itself to support that exchange. This section will discuss that
system in two parts, which largely coincide with the major
components of our existing patent system. It first considers the
question of patentability, namely what types of technological
packages should be exchanged in this market. Next, it
considers the exclusive rights and remedies that should
accompany a patent.
In discussing patentability and exclusion, the patent
system needed to support such a market will hew quite close to
the existing patent system; though, in a number of places the
emphasis will vary from current practice. Interestingly, most of
those new interpretations involve reforms that have already
been individually suggested in the scholarly literature. This
176

ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 278-79 (“Further, markets develop over
time with these complementary institutions. This development has to be understood as
a historical process, with the pace and form of the development influenced by starting
conditions and chance.”).
177
See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS xvii (2011)
(providing an extended discussion of property and institutions).

1366

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

section shows that these seemingly disparate areas of reform
can be seen as nudging the patent system toward a substantive
vision of the invention as the marketable technological
“thing,”178 and a system where exchange of the invention is the
system’s normative heart. This market-oriented narrative
provides an economically justified and unified basis for those
(until now) separate reforms.
A.

Patentability

The first role that the patent system plays is gatekeeping. The patent system thus must distinguish between the
packages that are and are not appropriate for exchange in this
market. Arrow and Samuelson emphasized that most packages
of information cannot be easily commodified for simple market
exchange. Yet, as shown above, the cost-saving process is an
exception to that general rule. The characteristics that made a
cost-saving process amenable to this exchange can be
generalized since the class of technological “things” that can be
exchanged in this market is well captured by patent law’s
definition of an invention: a solution to a technical problem
that has been refined such that it can be put into practice by
any person of skill in the art. I have aimed to solidify this
understanding of the invention in my recent work.179
Furthermore, a quick look to the gatekeeping statutory
provisions of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112 show that the invention
and the act of inventing, indeed, are the central features of the
patent system.180
1. The Cost-Savings Process
As discussed above, Arrow argued that both the
uncertainty and inappropriability of information made

178

See generally Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and
Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 382-87 (2005) (discussing the design of
legal things).
179
See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 32 at 5; Liivak, Finding
Invention, supra note 32, at 3-7.
180
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2006). In addition, not any invention should be
exchanged. The inventions should also be new and nonobvious. An already existing or
obvious invention would not be a solution that a person of skill would want to buy.
There is no reason to clutter this market with such un-needed inventions. In other
words, the requirements for patentability are designed such that only new, nonobvious,
and useful invention are patentable and thus available for open exchange in this
invention market.

2013]

ESTABLISHING AN ISLAND OF PATENT SANITY

1367

information ill-suited for markets.181 In particular, “the value of
information in developing further information is much more
conjectural . . . .”182 In the case of the cost-saving process, those
issues just do not apply. There, the information—the new
process—produces the sought-after product, and as a result,
users can value the process itself. That process had reached a
level of refinement where it worked and others were ready to
employ it. That level of refinement allowed the creator to
approach firms and describe what the process would do for
them. In an important sense, that cost-saving process—and
indeed the whole class of inventions generally—requires
refinement so that both technical and economic details come
into focus. On the technical side, the inventor can promise that
a skilled person can utilize the invention to achieve its
intended purpose. On the financial side, the firm can estimate
both the costs and benefits of that intended purpose. For the
cost-saving process, the inventor and the prospective utilizing
firms could place a value on the process.
Insofar as valuation is concerned, a cost-saving process
is likely the easiest case. The existing price system for tangible
goods should already have relatively well-defined prices for all
inputs and outputs of that cost-saving process. As the
hypothetical explored above assumed the cost-saving process to
be a new process for creating an old product, there was
assumed to be a well-established existing process in the public
domain. Given all that economic information, the inventor and
firms can price the cost-saving process. The ability to make
quantitative estimates about cost-saving process invention has
actually been highlighted for some time.183
Process inventions were an important part of the
earliest patent systems,184 and are certainly still an important
181

See supra Part II.C. As to uncertainty, Arrow noted two problems. First, he
argued that the value of the information was uncertain. Second, information
generation was risky and unpredictable. See supra notes 138-52.
182
Id.
183
See, e.g., ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 82, at 61
(“There is some possibility of estimating in money terms social benefit rendered by a
cost-saving invention . . . . [The benefit] can be estimated by the competitive prices of
the resources economized in the production of the original output.”); see also WILLIAM
D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 6 (1969).
184
See JUSTINE PILA, THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN INVENTION IN PATENT LAW 24
(2010) (“[A]n invention in 1623 is [thus] understood to have been an ingenious method
of working pre-existing materials to produce a useful result in the industrial arts. Put
differently, it was an industrial art, with ‘art’ in this context requiring an ingenious
purposive human action on the physical world.” (emphasis added)).
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part of patentable subject matter.185 Due to their potential for
valuation, the market narrative described in Part II can
provide justification for a patent system covering processes.
Nonetheless, the important question arises whether, beyond
process inventions, these same arguments can extend to the
other types of traditional patentable subject matter: “machine[s],
manufacture[s], or composition[s] of matter.”186 Beyond process
inventions, many have argued that valuation becomes harder.
Fritz Machlup, among others, argued that “[t]here is little
possibility, however, of estimating the social benefit of a
quality-improving invention, and almost no possibility in the
case of inventions of new products.”187
2. Inventions Beyond the Cost-Saving Process
Despite those worries, it really is not clear that the
valuation of a process and valuation of a machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter is so different. After all,
the inventor of a new machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter must also disclose both how to make that “thing” and
how to use it. In particular, in disclosing how to use the
invention, the inventor is disclosing a process for solving some
problem, and the utility of the “thing” is directly keyed to the
utility of that method of use. The main difference between
valuation of the cost-saving process and the process of using
some new, nonobvious “thing” is that normally, there will be less
information about the demand for the new use of that “thing.”
In addition to valuation uncertainty, Arrow also pointed
out that the creation of information has other aspects of
uncertainty.188 He noted that information production was
uncertain on the cost side of the equation since information
generation “must be a risky process, in that the output
(information obtained) can never be predicted perfectly from
the inputs.”189 Should these types of uncertainties matter? Does

185

See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (listing “process[es]” as one of the enumerated
classes of patentable subject matter).
186
Id.
187
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 82, at 61; see also 3
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 293 (3d ed. 2008) (“[V]alue is almost
impossible to determine, apart from such an obvious case as an improved process that
reduces everyone’s production costs by, say, 10 percent.”).
188
See Arrow, supra note 26, at 616.
189
Id.
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that extra uncertainty in the demand curve make inventions
ill-suited for a market exchange?
I argue that it should not. In fact, those inventors who
are willing to take on this risk are exactly those that the patent
bargain addresses. In other words, the target demographic of
the system is those with technical ability combined with the
ability to discern what solutions are needed (i.e., demanded by
the public). That type of uncertainty is very similar to
uncertainties that make life challenging for any firm selling
tangible goods and services. With its purpose of undergirding a
market for inventions, the patent system should be seen as
embracing not just inventors per se, but inventors as
entrepreneurs.190 In other words, though some uncertainty
remains—and surely valuation outside the cost-saving process
context will be more difficult—as a class, inventions have
properties that enable valuation such that rational economic
decisions can be made about both their creation and sale.
3. The Difficulty of Tracing Unauthorized Uses
In addition to uncertainty, Arrow also pointed out that
tracing difficulties made information largely inappropriable.
He argued that a patent system that could track and enforce
the unauthorized usage of most pieces of information would be
“unimaginably complex and subtle.”191 But for the cost-saving
process, these tracing concerns have far less force. The costsaving process is a specific set of physical steps that produces
the output product. Though such industrial techniques are
often practiced behind closed doors, there is no theoretical
problem with enforcing exclusive rights over that particular
process. Even if the issue merits further exploration, the
invention appears to be close to the right legal construct that
identifies the class of technological “things” able to be valued
and commodified.

190

See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT
(Augustus M. Kelly reprt. 1964) (1921), available at http://library.mises.org/
books/Frank%20H%20Knight/Risk,%20Uncertainty,%20and%20Profit.pdf (discussing
entrepreneurial aspects of business innovators).
191
Arrow, supra note 26, at 617.
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4. The Invention & Property Modularity
An application of the economist Herbert Simon’s concept
of modularity,192 which is further applied to the design of
property rights in the work of scholars like Henry Smith and
Carliss Baldwin, can assist this discussion.193 Simon’s work
“explain[ed] that the decomposition of a complex problem into
separate, more elementary subproblems, is an organizational
design issue.”194 As stressed by Henry Smith, such parsing of
problems into manageable parts reduces information costs,
which are critical aspects of property rights systems.195
Simon’s contribution to property theory provides
important support for the arguments made here. In particular,
the focus on the market for inventions (as opposed to
technology) can be seen as a direct application of those ideas.
Objections to markets in technology by Arrow and Samuelson
can be seen as information cost arguments—that such
arbitrary bundles of technological information do not easily fit
as modules within the existing price system.196 In contrast,
inventions are special modules that can fit. In particular, this
modular fit can be seen as designing the patent system (and its
market) to conform to and to leverage the institutional
competence of neoclassical firms. The patent system constrains
the patent-backed market to bundles of technological
information that the neoclassical firm can both value and
consume (i.e., utilize).
A quick outline of the capabilities of the neoclassical
firms makes this point explicit. Firms make business decisions
based on production possibilities consisting of production plans.
The firm’s engineers tell the business department of their
technological capabilities—their technical ability “to transform
arrays of commodities into different arrays.”197 This set of all
feasible production plans is called a production possibility set.198
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See Smith, supra note 112, at 1761; Merges, supra note 96, at 1480, 1514.
See Smith, supra note 112, at 1761-66; Carliss Y. Baldwin & Joachim
Henkel, The Impact of Modularity on Intellectual Property and Value Appropriation 35, 9 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-040, 2012), available at
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6894.html.
194
ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 99.
195
Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691,
1702-08 (2012).
196
See id. at 1708-09 (describing the Lego-like fit of a well-designed module).
197
KREPS, supra note 166, at 234.
198
Id. at 234-39.
193
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Armed with that information, the neoclassical firm aims
to make the best business decision as to what production plan
to actually implement. To determine the best production plan,
the business department must estimate the demand for all
possible outputs and then calculate the profit available for
implementing a particular production plan. The goal for a
profit-maximizing firm is, as the name implies, to pick the
production plan that maximizes its profit.199
Aiming to leverage modular design, the market for
inventions is specifically designed to interface with those firms
and their capabilities. In particular, inventions are defined
such that those firms can place a value on them. Inventions in
this regard can be thought of as particular production plans.200
In essence, inventors approach these neoclassical firms and tell
them about the utility of their invention; they tell the firms
what their invention can do as a completed production plan.
The firms then can redo their profit maximization calculation,
now incorporating the one added production plan (i.e., the
invention) into its production possibility set. The profit
difference between these two calculations is the value of the
invention to the firm.
Importantly, the patent system is not then an isolated
market separate from the regular price system. Rather, the
patent system is designed to interface with the existing price
system. It takes the neoclassical firms and then builds a
market with inventions for those firms. Buying and selling
inventions becomes an endogenous extension of the existing
neoclassical model. Neoclassical firms can, for a licensing fee,
receive the invention from the inventor and thereby expand
their production possibilities. In a sense, technological growth
(and the direction of technological growth) becomes an
endogenous result of these specialized invention-producing
firms interacting with the invention-consuming firms via the
invention market.201

199

See id. at 239-53.
More precisely, each particular embodiment that makes up an invention is
a particular production plan.
201
See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON.
S71, S71 (1990).
200
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5. Research Plans & Abstract Ideas Are Not Yet
Inventions
Along with defining the types of technological advances
the system aims to make into marketable commodities, this
market narrative also suggests the types of advances that
cannot be easily commodified. As to his criticisms, Arrow noted
that among all the types of information, “basic research, the
output of which is only used as an informational input into
other inventive activities, is especially unlikely to be rewarded
[in a market].”202 Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear
that basic scientific discoveries are not patentable subject
matter.203 This boundary of patentability coincides with the
market narrative, and such basic discoveries are too hard to
value and pose serious tractability problems for enforceable
property rights.
Furthermore, patentable subject matter does not extend
to “abstract ideas,” though the patent bar has been at a loss to
articulate the exact contours of abstract ideas.204 The marketbased narrative gives some hints as to the proper definition of
abstract ideas. Often, en route toward creating an invention,
inventors do develop technological advances and information
that are useful for ultimately creating a workable production
plan (i.e., an invention). This intermediate information is
surely, in a sense, useful, yet these intermediate results should
not be patentable—they are not yet inventions. Though
important, these intermediate steps are too hard to price
because it is too difficult to later separate out the relative
contributions that produced the actual invention. Without
knowing the ultimate inventions that will flow from the
intermediate result, the valuation of those intermediate results
remains highly uncertain. For example, bridges are certainly
useful human creations, and by comparing the bridge crossing
to alternative routes, we could hopefully judge the utility and
value of the bridge. Now imagine an unfinished bridge
spanning three quarters of your favorite body of water like the
San Francisco Bay or the Hudson River.205 How much will you
pay for the right to use that bridge? Certainly it is useful—it
202

Arrow, supra note 26, at 618.
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
204
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
205
See Lee Anne Fennel, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1956
(2012) (opening her discussion with the image of a partially completed bridge).
203
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gets you most of the way across—yet valuation has become
much harder. For this reason, advances that are not completed
inventions, but are still just “research plans” or “abstract
ideas,” do not receive patent protection.206 They are not
appropriate for this market and its special needs.
Scientific discoveries and incomplete technological
advances (abstract ideas) also suffer from traceability
problems. It is difficult to detect and police unauthorized use of
these types of information. In this regard, the existing patent
statute, which explicitly grants protection to inventions only,
takes advantage of modularity. Only specific packages of
information couple and properly fit with the existing price
system, and only those packages are recognized by the patent
system.
6. Connections to Existing Scholarship
This new patent narrative emphasizes a number of
features of the patent system, many of which have been the
subject of independent calls for reform. Inventions are the
specific solution to some technical problem that has been
conceived by its creator—the inventor. To qualify as an
invention, the solution must be refined enough that it works for
its intended purpose—i.e., it actually solves the problem it aims
to solve—and that it can be described in enough detail so that
without additional information, “any” person of skill in that
technological area can practice it.207 It requires that little tacit

206

See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1356-57 (Fed.
Cir. 2010). Though Ariad is most often seen as a disclosure case, there is an alternate
interpretation. The patentee in Ariad had indeed created a technological advance
noting that disruption of the NF-kB pathway would likely reduce the harmful side
effects of the inflammation caused by the pathway. That information may be useful but
it had not yet matured to become an invention. Their advance had not matured to the
level of completion and specificity to become a market commodity. Note there has
always been a curious, relatively unexplored kinship between many § 101 and § 112
cases. For that reason, I have grouped § 101 and § 112 together as the requirements
based on the existence of an invention. See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note
32, at 23 (arguing for considering both § 101 and § 112 in concert where § 101 asks
whether the patentee invented anything at all and § 112 ensures that the claims do not
exceed the invention disclosed in the specification).
207
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). That definition takes advantage of modularity by
ensuring the technological thing is developed to the point that it can be transported
from one firm to the next. In fact, it must be ready to be deployed by “any” person of
skill in the art. See ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 101 (describing the benefits to
requiring “a better understanding of each other’s problems and needs, to share common
objectives and beliefs, and to adopt a common language” (internal citation omitted)).
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knowledge208 is necessary to practice the invention. By doing so,
the patent system ensures that patentable inventions are ready
to be commodified and widely (and easily) disseminated.209
Recently, scholars have argued for such reforms. Both
Christopher Cotropia and I have been advocating for a
conceptual understanding of the invention as the actual
technological “thing” the inventor creates.210 The current vision
of the invention is not mainly as the technological “thing,” but
solely as shorthand for the claimed subject matter. In my view,
that conceptual void of the invention is tied to the incentive
view. We both argue that a focus returning to the technological
creation would not only keep the system true to its statutory and
constitutional underpinnings, but also solve many of the current
controversies in patent law. In a market for inventions narrative,
the central focus is the substantive invention—i.e., the solution
created by the invention that consumers will buy and use.
In addition to patentable subject matter and the invention,
the utility requirement plays an important gatekeeping role. For
processes or tangible “things” like manufactures or machines, the
utility derived from the invention determines the users’ valuation.
Thus, the utility requirement demands a rather specific level of
usefulness. Basic scientific discoveries certainly are highly
useful (in fact they are often essential) for innovation, but,
nonetheless, they should be excluded from patentability
because their utility is neither specific nor can be agreed upon.
For example, consider a chemical engineering firm that designs
and builds petrochemical refineries. For them, Boyle’s law
(defining an inverse relationship between pressure and volume
of a gas) matters, but how much does it matter?211 How much
should they pay for it? That is a hard question to answer and,
again, that is why Arrow viewed the broad notion of a market
for technology with skepticism. The utility requirement

208

See MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 9-10 (1966) (explaining “the
basic structure of tacit knowing”).
209
Cf. Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships,
and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1523
(2012) (describing difficulties in technology transfer in cases of basic and early applied
research where significant tacit knowledge is still present therefore urging caution for
patent protection for early stage and basic research).
210
See Cotropia, supra note 34, at 1855; Liivak, supra note 32, at 5.
211
See Glenn Research Ctr., Boyle’s Law, NASA, http://www.grc.nasa.gov/
WWW/k-12/airplane/boyle.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2011).
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ensures that patentable inventions are only those technological
“things” that have specific utility.212
The Supreme Court made this point clear in Brenner v.
Manson, in which it upheld the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals’ denial of patentability to a chemical process where the
utility of the resulting product was still highly uncertain.213 The
Court reasoned that patentability should not attach “[u]nless and
until a process is refined and developed to th[e] point . . . where
specific benefit exists in currently available form . . . .”214 The
Court famously concluded, “a patent is not a hunting license. It is
not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful
conclusion.”215 From the perspective of a market for inventions, the
utility requirement instructs innovators to continue to work and
refine their work until it is substantially ready for any person of
skill to use and value it.
Others have already been calling for such reinvigoration
of the utility requirement. In a pair of articles, Michael Risch
has argued for a utility requirement that would extend to what
he calls “commercial usefulness.”216 He reasoned “that a core
benefit of the [utility] requirement is to aid in the
commercialization of inventions” in order to “ensure that
inventions are worth more to the public than they cost.”217 Such
reforms, focusing on concepts like commercial utility, are in line
with a patent system whose goal is to back a market in inventions.
Lastly, there has been a long-standing debate over the
proper timing of patent protection. Should patent protection
attach early or late in the development of some technological
advance? Ed Kitch’s “prospect” theory of patents asserts that
early-stage patenting allows the inventor to mine the patent
prospect more efficiently since it gives the inventor both central
and exclusive control to coordinate the development and the
commercialization of the invention.218 John Duffy recently
added to these early-stage filing rationales by arguing that
212

Closely related to the above discussion of modularity, there is an emerging
strand of property research exploring “lumpy” property. See Fennel, supra note 205, at
1964. The patent system when seen through this market narrative appears to be a good
example of that lumpiness.
213
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1966).
214
Id. at 534-35.
215
Id. at 536.
216
See Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 120406 (2010) [hereinafter Risch, Reinventing Usefulness]; Michael Risch, A Surprisingly
Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 67 (2011).
217
Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 216, at 1197, 1199.
218
Kitch, supra note 77, at 265, 276-79.
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early filing had an overlooked, yet important, benefit: an
earlier patent expiration and thus, an earlier entry into the
public domain.219
Pushing in the other direction, scholars such as
Christopher Cotropia and Ted Sichelman have argued that
early filing alone is a mistake.220 According to Cotropia, “early
filing forces inventors to make decisions and draft applications
with little technical or market information about the
invention.”221 He noted that “all inventors would be required to
reduce their invention to practice before [filing] . . . .”222 His
arguments are consistent with the market narrative that this
article develops. Certainly the inventor must reduce the invention
to practice. To be marketed to others, the invention needs to work
for its intended purpose. And to overcome the objections by Arrow
and Samuelson, it needs to be developed so that in negotiating
exchange, there is enough technical and market information for
both inventors and users to reach agreement.
As is clear, the market narrative requires relatively
clear technological and market information. As a result,
reforms for later filings, where the patentee needs to have an
invention (not just some technological idea), generally support
a market in inventions.
B.

Exclusive Rights, Harm, and Remedies

The second critical role for the patent system is to
support the socially beneficial behavior of creating and
disseminating inventions via exclusive rights. The system
needs to recognize the third party actions that would harm or
disrupt that socially beneficial behavior, and then define the
exclusive rights of a patent in order to prohibit those harms.
219

John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 469 (2004).
220
Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 74-75 (2010); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 341, 355-57 (2010) (arguing for a new additional type of narrow patent protection
specifically aimed efforts to commercialize inventions).
221
Cotropia, supra note 220, at 69.
222
Id. at 71. Cotropia ultimately argues for a requirement that the invention
be actually reduced to practice rather than constructively through filing the patent
application (as is currently permitted). I would not go so far as to require actual
reduction to practice. There is nothing wrong with constructive reduction to practice as
long as we take it seriously. It is not meant to be a shortcut for inventors. Constructive
reduction to practice, as any legal use of the word constructive, is a legal fiction where
the technological advance has been refined to such a point that it could just as easily
have been actually reduced to practice but for the sake of efficiency it was not.
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This section will find that the inventor needs to prevent the
unauthorized making, using, selling, offering to sell, and even
importing the patented invention, which the current system
grants as exclusive rights. Yet a system based on an exchange
of inventions will diverge quite dramatically from the current
system in regards to remedies. Remedies will no longer be seen
as aiming to ensure that the artificial incentive of the patent
reaches the patent holder. Instead, the aim of patent remedies
will be to repair the actual harm done to the inventor’s
dissemination plan; if a patent holder is not disseminating their
invention, however, it is generally much harder to find any harm.
1. Exclusive Rights and Correlative Duties to Refrain
from Harm
Having identified and selected the proper “thing”—the
invention—for this market, the next question is what set of
exclusive rights (if any) are needed. Rather than beginning
that discussion with exclusive rights, it is better to first
examine the Hohfeldian correlative duties—the duty of third
parties to avoid causing harm to the market—that constitute
the exclusive rights.223 In other words, the discussion above
describes socially beneficial behavior and the actions that could
interfere with that beneficial behavior.224 The discussion below
reveals that those duties to prevent harm to the market may
coincide nicely with the exclusive rights that the current patent
statute grants.
For the market to work properly, each consumer must
signal their valuation of the invention based on their use. The
following discusses the various ways this signaling function can
be disrupted in descending order of seriousness. First, outright
piracy of the invention is the most harmful act for the market.
Imagine that the inventor discloses the invention to another,
who then turns around and sells the invention him or herself.
Each sale made by the pirate would be a lost valuation and if
piracy were widespread, then such a market would not function.
In other words, the rest of us should abide by a duty to abstain
from selling inventions that are not our own.225 Accordingly, the
223

See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 36-37 (1913).
224
See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 275, 278 (2008).
225
Note, however, that the issue of independent invention complicates this
straightforward rule. See Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent
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patent system should (and does) grant an exclusive right to the
inventor to “sell” and “offer[] to sell” the invention.226
Consider now someone who obtains an unauthorized
copy of the invention from the inventor, but has no intention of
selling or disseminating it to others. Rather, they just want to
utilize the invention themselves. This is not as bad as outright
piracy, but the usage is a lost signal from that one particular
user. Again, if widespread, the market would not work properly
and so, the patent system should accordingly grant an
exclusive right “to use” the invention.
Lastly, there may be instances where a third party
intends to either sell or use the invention him or herself, and
he or she makes the invention first. In order to stave off the
harm from unauthorized sales or uses, it seems reasonable to
pre-emptively grant an exclusive right “to make” the invention,
but this case is less clear. For example, making the invention
for purposes of testing it or understanding how it works (even
by competitors) does not seem harmful immediately. This
market narrative leaves significant room for a research-use
exemption to the exclusive right to make and, to some degree,
to use as well.227
In addition to considering the acts that would cause
harm, it is important to consider what particular “thing” would
cause harm through its “making, using, or selling.” The harm
comes from using or selling the inventor’s invention—the solution
the inventor intends is to sell to others him or herself. The
exclusive rights need not extend beyond the inventor’s actual
invention; though this area is controversial, there are ample
statutory arguments already establishing that the current patent
statute could not extend exclusive rights beyond the invention.228
That limitation coincides with the market narrative.
With the exception of suggesting a reinvigorated
research-use exception, the market for inventions narrative
supports an array of exclusive rights quite similar to those
granted by the current patent statute. But the narrative places
those exclusive rights in a very different context. In particular,
Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643, 1680-81 (2010). The implications of independent invention for
this market-based model are left for future work.
226
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
227
See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1074-78 (1989)
(recommending the creation of an experimental use exemption in patent law).
228
See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 32, at 5; Liivak, Finding
Invention, supra note 32, at 58-59.
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the market narrative defines the rights under circumstances
where market actors are directly harmed. The current
incentive-based narrative, instead, views exclusion as the
reward for having earned a patent: harm is not a central part
of that story.229
By constructing the normative theory of patent law
around socially beneficial behavior and then predicating
exclusion around preventing the third-party actions that harm
that beneficial behavior, patent law can finally begin to
integrate itself with other bodies of private law.230 There have
been recent calls to introduce a concept of harm into patent
law. Hovenkamp and Bohannon argue that “[a]n essential part
of an infringement lawsuit should be proof of actual injury.”231
This market narrative provides a way for patent law to develop
this necessary notion of harm.
2. Remedies
So far in discussing patentability and exclusive rights,
though there are have been differences in emphasis, the
current patent system looks quite similar to the patent system
necessary to support a market in inventions. The critical
conceptual difference between this market narrative and the
incentive narrative is the purpose of the patent system. In the
incentive narrative, patents create incentives that would
otherwise not exist; in the market narrative, the system aims to
support and enable already existing incentives for transmission
from invention consumers to the invention producers. As
described above, that new purpose adds context to the
discussion of exclusive rights. In the market narrative,
exclusion is not granted just to transfer wealth; rather, it
enables a beneficial exchange of inventions. That purpose is the
ends for which the exclusion is (part of) the means. As a result,
the means are tempered to serve (and not interfere with) those
ends. That difference in purpose makes its most visible
appearance in the discussion of remedies.
The patent statute provides for two types of remedies:
damages and injunctive relief. For damages, the court shall
229

HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 61 (“[T]he patent system
lacks a serious harm requirement . . . .”).
230
See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56 (1995). But see
Sichelman, supra note 66, at 2-4 (noting the disconnect between current patent theory
and private law).
231
HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 15.
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“award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for
the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”232 Viewed
from the incentive narrative, “damages adequate to compensate
for the infringement” has a relatively straightforward
interpretation.233 Congress designed the system to provide a
certain incentive to the patent holder and, through unauthorized
infringement, the defendant has failed to contribute to that
incentive. From this view, damages should aim to give the
patent holder the incentive that Congress intended. Yet, owing
directly to the intractable nature of the incentive narrative,
nobody really knows what (from a policy perspective) that
incentive should be. As a result, patent damages have been
mired in real controversy.
When viewed from the market narrative, a different
interpretation emerges. As the purpose of the system is to
provide for an institution where inventions can be exchanged,
exclusion is aimed to prevent harm to that institution.
Therefore, “damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement” should also look to the harm as a result of the
defendant’s infringing actions.234 That view provides context for
determinations of remedies that is far richer than the more
absolutist incentive narrative. For example, a difference
appears in the understanding of reasonable royalties provided
by the statutory language—that damages are “in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by
the infringer . . . .”235
Currently, interpretation of that provision requires
consideration of multiple factors—the Georgia-Pacific factors—
identified by the case that first listed them.236 Among other
factors, a reasonable royalty should consider
the amount that a licensor . . . and a licensee . . . would have agreed
upon . . . if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach
an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent
licensee . . . would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be
able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been
acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.237

232

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
237
Id.
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From the perspective of the incentive narrative, the GeorgiaPacific factors analyze what the hypothetical license is for the
exclusive rights controlled by the patent holder: how much
would a patentee demand, knowing that the patent grants
relatively absolute rights of exclusion? As with patent law’s
more general damages calculation, the reasonable royalty
calculation has been very imprecise, uncertain, and vaguely
circular. In this formulation, a reasonable royalty is a license to
make or use the “things” circumscribed by the exclusive rights,
not a license for “the use made of the invention” as instructed
by the statute.
A different, more consistent view emerges when
considered from the perspective of the market narrative. There,
the minimum value of a “use made of the invention” makes
much more sense since it can be literally interpreted. In the
market narrative, some infringers can cause quite a bit of
harm. Outright pirates can, for example, reduce revenue for
the inventor to near zero. For such harmful acts, the patent
statute rightfully should aim to determine how much the
patentee would have made without the defendant’s piracy. The
well-known alternate remedy of lost profits would be
appropriate in those circumstances.
Yet, others are not as harmful as pirates. Some are
simply using the invention (and gaining its useful benefits)
without paying for it. They are not further disseminating the
invention. In that case, the patentee is just missing out on the
licensing fee the user would have agreed to in order to use the
invention. That missing revenue, which fits cleanly into the
market narrative, is then seen as the purpose of the minimum
damages provision and provides the proper remedy in the fact
pattern described. There is no further consideration of an extra
(monopoly derived) fee that the patentee could leverage based
on her patent position because, in the market narrative, the
patent system does not aim to necessarily grant such profits.
The system only aims to enable inventors to reap revenues
equal to the sum of the licensing fees from those that use the
invention. Where a user slips through that licensing system,
the patent system aims for the patentee to be able to capture
that lost revenue.238

238

Treble damages do exist as a stick to force potential users of the invention
into ex ante licensing with the patent holder. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.

1382

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

Similar differences can be described for patent law’s
injunctive relief that, by statute, are granted “in accordance
with the principles of equity.”239 In the absolutist incentive
narrative, injunctive relief would be common and rather
independent of both the patentee’s efforts to commercialize and
the defendant’s actions.240 In contrast with the market
narrative, injunctive relief would become far more contextual,
depending on the harm that the defendant’s infringement was
causing. In addition to depending on the defendant’s actions,
the harm and injunctive relief would also depend on the patent
holder’s actions as well. Efforts to disseminate the invention to
those that can use it (the central mission of the system) would
figure prominently in the equitable decision to grant and tailor
injunctive relief.241
In various guises, reforms resembling those suggested
above have emerged in the literature, yet most of them suffer
from still being tied to the incentive narrative. For example,
many have been calling for a notion of harm in patent law.
Cotter and Blair suggested as much ten years ago.242 Lee Anne
Landers similarly looks for such notion, and Bohannon and
Hovenkamp spend a great deal of their recent book arguing for
a concept of harm.243
Though that direction is certainly in line with the
argument here, the continued shadow of the incentive
narrative has limited those suggestions. For example, Landers
focuses on remedies and argues for “the fundamental premise
that a patentee’s harm cannot be greater than the patentee’s
contribution.”244 Lemley and Shapiro further argue, “patent
royalties [should] bear some reasonable relationship to what
patentees actually contributed.”245
Though I agree with much of that work, it does not go
far enough to define its terms. The trouble is that
“contribution” is far too vague a concept to really reform
remedies. Does the contribution include market information
developed by the patentee, other inventions that were inspired
239

Id. § 283.
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423-27 (1908).
241
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395-97 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the rise of patent trolls should impact the
equitable factors relevant for the grant of a permanent injunction).
242
Blair & Cotter, supra note 52, at 48-49.
243
See generally HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79.
244
Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and
Sequential Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 471-72 (2012).
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by the patentee, or other assorted technological information
that is developed as a consequence of developing the invention?
Because it does not answer these types of questions,
contribution remains too ill defined. As made clear above, the
invention is a more specific, manageable concept by which to
judge remedies. Indeed, Lemley and Shapiro implicitly define
their notion of contribution along lines that are similar to the
notion of the invention developed here. Their discussion of
remedies “develop[s] a benchmark level for the royalty rate,
i.e., the royalty rate that would be reasonable and expected in
the ideal patent system without any element of holdup.”246After
developing that notion of a baseline, Lemley and Shapiro then
go on to show that patent licensing revenue can exceed that
baseline since patentees leverage their “holdup power” (or as I
describe, the naked exclusion of the patent).247
Perhaps not surprisingly, their proposal ran headlong
into criticism, which came from a straightforward application
of the incentive narrative.248 After all, as they describe, “[t]he
Federal Circuit has concluded that this ‘additional leverage in
licensing’ is ‘a natural consequence of the right to exclude and
not an inappropriate reward’ to a patentee.”249 For instance,
John Golden criticized Lemley and Shapiro’s “lack of a welljustified baseline for determining whether royalties are
‘excessive.’”250 According to Golden, they failed to show “that
[their] specific royalty ‘benchmark,’ . . . represents the socially
optimal level of patent-holder compensation.”251 “[T]hey do
remarkably little to justify this use. How could they?”252
Certainly within the framework of the incentive
narrative, it is near impossible to prove that any level of
protection provides the socially optimal level of protection, a
difficulty Lemley and Shapiro admit.253 The point is that their
baseline has come under fire largely because the idea of a
baseline derived from the utility of the invention is just foreign.
Yet exactly such a concept does emerge naturally from the
market narrative.

246
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248
249
250
251
252
253

Id. at 1999 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 1999-2000.
Golden, supra note 41, at 2115.
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 2010.
Golden, supra note 41,at 2115.
Id. at 2115-16 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2137.
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 2166.
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Of the recent discussions of remedies, Paul Heald’s work
comes closest to the suggestions made in this article. Heald
makes clear that his reforms are based, at least in part, on a
transaction model of technological exchange. He highlights the
problems with the incentive model, noting that they
provide no help in calculating an upper-bound for patent remedies.
Given that most current debates in patent law involve claims of
overcompensation to patentees, the lack of means to measure
whether damages are excessive is glaring. It is no surprise that the
conventional incentive theory of patent law has proven to be of little
use in resolving present debates over the scope of patent remedies.254

As Heald lays out his arguments for reforming patent
remedies, he focuses on the “gross value of the invention to the
exploiting firm in terms of profits earned from additional sales
or manufacturing costs saved . . . .”255 Much of his sophisticated
analysis of remedies in the transactional context can be
employed to structure remedies in the market narrative
presented here.
3. Patent Duration
In the incentive narrative, patent duration has long
been seen as one of the central policy levers that can modulate
the patent incentive. For example, economists have employed
sophisticated models to justify the patent term from within
that incentive narrative.256 Though the exact length of the
patent term is contested, there is consensus that the patent
term should not be infinite (constitutionally, it cannot be257) and
likely should be shorter than the copyright term. As with the
rest of the patent incentive narrative, the patent term is seen
as giving a rough estimate of the necessary incentive to
optimize innovation.
Yet in the market-based narrative advocated for here,
there is no attempt to dial-in the right amount of artificial
incentives since the purpose of the system is the mutually
beneficial exchange of inventions. With that narrative, how
long should society protect that exchange? As it is more squarely
designed as a natural extension of private property, does this
narrative suggest an infinite patent term? After all, if revenue
254
255
256
257

Heald, Optimal Remedies, supra note 105, at 1173 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1176-77 (emphasis omitted).
NORDHAUS, supra note 183, at 76-90.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
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(from sales of the invention derived a few years after filing the
patent) should go to the inventor, why shouldn’t revenue derived
fifty years from filing go as well? What patent term is demanded
by the market narrative? How long should patents last?
This section gives what appears as an initially smug
answer: the patent term should last long enough, but need not
be unnecessarily long. That statement can be given workable
form by considering the idea of the “effective patent life.”258
Independent of the actual patent term, effective patent life
describes the time the invention is created until the underlying
invention is no longer demanded by consumers—e.g., where the
invention is overtaken by newer, better developments.259 As
long as the actual patent term is longer than the effective
patent life, all the relevant revenue is directed to the patent
holder; it is presumed to go to zero afterwards for the rest of
the patent term. This supports the policy rationale that the
patent term needs to be long enough—i.e., it needs to be longer
that the effective patent life in most industries—and there is
some evidence that this is less than the twenty-year patent
term in some cases.260
With the argument that the actual patent term should
be greater than the effective invention life, why isn’t the easiest
resolution (aside from constitutional issues) to just set the
patent term to infinity? We would then be assured that the
actual patent term exceeds the effective patent life. The short
answer is that such an infinite term is not necessary to
substantially achieve the purpose of the system. The system is
designed to allocate today’s scarce resources toward the
creation and dissemination of tomorrow’s inventions. The
success of that system relies upon the business judgment of
entrepreneurial inventors. They are the ones making the
judgment (and taking the associated risks) that balance today’s
opportunity costs of the scarce resources against the aggregate
revenue they could receive during the patent term from
licensing the invention. As the patent term is extended, more
inventive projects are becoming feasible, but the marginal
incentive of each additional year decreases exponentially.

258

Ted O’Donoghue et al., Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of
Technological Progress, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 2-5 (1998).
259
Id.
260
Id. at 2.
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Justice Breyer’s dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft cited economists
making just this point in an amicus brief.261
Though some might quibble with discount rates, a
twenty-year patent term captures approximately seventy-five
percent of the discounted present value of an infinite patent
term assuming constant demand for the invention.262 Note that
this last assumption is highly contested and likely far too
generous; as suggested above, inventions may well have
effective patent terms where demand drops often quite
dramatically during the patent term.263 With Moore’s Law
impacting many areas of computing, doubling many relevant
performance metrics every eighteen months,264 demand for
inventions surely drops radically during the twenty-year
term.265 The result is that a twenty-year patent term likely is
long enough for inventors to recoup the costs of their
investments in many cases. That being said, this new narrative
does open the door to a different exploration of the patent term,
apart from (and no longer constrained by) the incentive
narrative.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

A.

Unified Patent Law and Industry-Specific Innovation

As described above, one result of this new patent
narrative is that the scope of patent exclusion should not
extend beyond the invention created and disclosed by the
inventor. As I have argued elsewhere, there are good doctrinal
and policy reasons to adopt this unified limitation for all
patentees.266 There is one facet of this unified argument,
however, that appears troubling at first.
261

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254-55 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 5-7, Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186 (No. 01-618) (making their calculations with
a seven percent discount rate).
263
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 267-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[U]ncontested data
indicate that no author could rationally expect that a stream of copyright royalties will
be constant forever.”).
264
See Nathan Myhrvold, Moore’s Law Corollary: Pixel Power, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 2006, at G3.
265
If Moore’s law holds across a twenty year period and doubles every 18
months, the relevant performance metric has increased by a factor of about 10,000
during twenty years. How much would you pay for a computer that is 10,000 slower
than your current computer?
266
See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 32, at 5; Liivak, Finding
Invention, supra note 32, at 50-52.
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During the course of the past decade,267 Dan Burk and
Mark Lemley authored a series of articles arguing that
innovation varies by industry and that, though it is a daunting
task, patent law should take these industry differences into
account.268 Their work culminated in a book, which principally
argues that,
[A] purely unitary patent system no longer fits the extraordinarily
diverse needs of innovators in today’s technology industries . . . [and]
that the solution is not to split the patent system into industryspecific protection statutes, but to tailor the unitary patent rules on
a case-by-case basis to the needs of different industries . . . .269

There are two components of their arguments. First, as a
positive matter, they observe that different technology
industries have different risk, cost, and revenue profiles.270
Second, taking the incentive narrative for patents as a given,
those differences should be accounted for by the incentives
granted by an optimized patent system.271 As a corollary, any
strictly uniform patent system must under- and overincentivize some industries.272 To a large extent, their views
have gained traction. There is agreement that the “‘factually
right answer[s]’ to problematic questions about the duration
and scope of IP rights . . . are very complex and may vary
considerably from one industry to the next.”273
So how does the unified patent system (and, in
particular, the unified patent exclusion) developed here deal
with these industry-specific differences? At a high level of
generality, the short answer is that it doesn’t deal with the
issue directly. More precisely, the patent system developed
here doesn’t need to deal with it directly—that is an important
strength of a system not aiming to calibrate incentives itself;
rather, it polices and channels behavior.
The patent institution developed here should be seen as
a socially beneficial, fairly universal tool that can be utilized by
innovative businesses. The purpose of the institution and its
underlying rules should be well publicized, and if a firm can
267

See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at vii.
See id. at 38.
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Id. at 5.
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See id. at 38.
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See id. at 66.
272
SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 117 (noting the “defect . . . aris[ing] from the
‘onesize fits all’ [IP system] . . . [i]t is almost inevitable that some classes of innovations
are under rewarded and others are overrewarded relative to the costs of invention.”).
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beneficially utilize the institution, then they will use it—i.e.,
the firms themselves are in the best position to judge the needs
and frailties of their business models. Patent law provides one
of many tools they can turn to and layer in order to structure
that business. In short, patent law writ large need not be
industry specific, but as differing firms will differ in the way
and amount that they rely on the system, the net effect will
address those differing requirements. For example, despite the
very divergent needs of an apartment-building developer in
Manhattan and a rancher in Montana, both can utilize fairly
uniform property laws even though they are using the tool of
property to support very different businesses.
Furthermore, though the overall structure of property is
the same in Montana and Manhattan, it is the institution that
can quite effectively account for their contextual differences,
primarily in regards to harms and remedies. Here, in the
domain of remedies, courts can deploy contextual differences
and their own experience of best business practices in other
market arenas, in order to help tailor concepts (like patent
harm and patent remedies) that reflect industrial and
contextual differences in markets for inventions.
B.

Further Research

Though the above section outlined both the economic
justification for a market in inventions and the exclusive rights
and remedies necessary for that system, there are many
detailed economic and legal issues that still need to be
explored. Real questions remain as to the impact of price
discrimination on the analysis, the impact and role of
independent inventors, the role of compulsory licensing, and
the relationship between optimality and spillovers. Answers to
these significant questions will surely help shed light on the
strengths and weaknesses of this proposed view and purpose of
the patent system.
CONCLUSION
This article has established that private decisionmaking alone (without the influence of artificial incentives) can
align with society’s interest in allocating resources toward
creating inventions. In other words, a simple market exchange
for disseminating inventions is socially justified. Importantly,
the justification does not extend broadly to a market in
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technology generally, but rather only to a market in inventions.
Inventions are special technological “things” that, in contrast to
other technological information, can be valued and negotiated
by neoclassical firms. With that narrowed focus, the article
established the social benefits created by the voluntary
exchange of inventions. In this narrative, the patent system
leverages a modular design, which enables it to interface with
neoclassical firms through the price system and, thereby, also
allows the system’s benefits to be quantified and ultimately
justified.
Though not emphasized throughout, this narrative is
not an exclusive one. It leaves room for others to either expand
this narrative or to form some other alternative in order to
justify another aspect of patent ecosystem. This market
narrative supports parts of the existing patent system, while it
does not explicitly remove support for other areas—the existing
incentive narrative with all its faults and ambiguities still is
there. But in effect, if it can develop a consensus behind it, this
new market narrative will implicitly force out these intractable
narratives. As for behavior, like patent trolling, that is outside
the justification of the market narrative, proponents of trolling
will need to develop their own convincing case for troll
behavior—I doubt such a case can be made.
Furthermore, even as to the market narrative itself, this
is not the end of the story; rather, it is just the beginning. This
brief introduction to the market narrative leaves many
important and interesting questions for future research.
Though only scratching the surface, the hope is that this article
establishes that certain specific acts—namely creating and
disseminating an invention—can be economically justified. The
patent system may be necessary to protect those activities. By
developing a patent narrative with these more familiar market
oriented economic arguments, it is hoped that new doors are
opened for a more thorough economic exploration and
refinement of the patent system. And if we’re lucky, that might
lead to consensus and acceptance.

